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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The past twenty-five years have been a period of phenomenal growth and change
for the private equity industry. Private equity firms have increased their capital under
management over 23,000%, from $4 billion in 1980 to over $950 billion in 2006,
primarily through venture capital and leveraged buyout funds. 1 The industry’s increase
in size has been accompanied by an increase in its economic significance with 15 of the
largest 20 buyouts in history taking place between May 2005 and October 2006. In total,
the number of U.S.-based corporations taken private in 2006 was 1,013 at a total
investment of $406.2 billion, and $25.5 billion was invested in venture capital projects by
private equity firms. This increased activity has forced the finance community to debate
whether private equity should be considered an asset class of its own.
Anson (2006) contends that alternative assets, including private equity, are
generally a subset of an existing asset class and that investment in these subsets are
simply part of different investment strategies. Contrary to this opinion, Meyer and
Mathonet (2005) suggest that private equity’s economic significance now ranks it with
stocks, bonds, and real estate as an asset class of its own. Though academic research has

1

Source: Thomson Venture Economics, data for partnerships – firms investing own capital only; excludes
fund of funds; includes U.S. buyout and venture funds. Figure 1.1 at this end of this chapter exhibits the
industry’s dramatic increase in size, as well as, its potential to become an even stronger participant in the
finance community.
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provided extensive coverage of the traditional asset classes, its examination of the
private equity industry is only in its infancy. The primary reason for this lag is the result
of limited data availability; therefore, many notable research questions regarding the
private equity industry remain unanswered.

We attempt to bridge this gap by

investigating unresolved issues pertaining to the measurement of private equity
performance.
Currently, the primary direction of private equity research is concentrated on
comparing private equity performance to the performance of public securities. Several
studies have documented the returns of private equity relative to public equity with
varying results. Most notably, Kaplan and Schoar (2005) find that private equity fund
returns approximately equal public market returns for the period 1980 through 2001.
However, they document large amounts of heterogeneity across funds when relating
returns to fund size and persistence. They find evidence linking performance positively
to both the size and sequence number of the fund. 2 This suggests that the managers of
larger private equity funds enjoy above average returns and managers experience some
level of learning as they progress through fund cycles. Using an updated version of
Kaplan and Schoar’s (2005) dataset, Phalippou and Zollo (2005) find that PE funds
underperform public markets when correcting for a sample selection bias, and they
suggest that fund investor learning could partially explain their findings. In a follow-up
study, Phalippou and Gottschalg (2006) validate the findings of Phalippou and Zollo
(2005) documenting even greater underperformance after correcting for the same sample
selection bias found in the original study and writing off all aged investments of the funds
2

Funds are raised in sequences, such that a manager’s first fund is 1, second is 2 and so forth.
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with a low probability of recovery. The general consensus of the above studies is that
the average private equity investment, which carries greater risk than public securities,
has not rewarded investors for assuming this risk.
A prevailing question remains as to why investors continue to allocate large
amounts of capital to private equity given its below average performance. Anson (2004)
posits that active portfolio managers have fallen into a dangerous habit of “hugging” their
benchmarks by holding well-diversified portfolios.

As he points out, this strategy

minimizes risk, but it also minimizes the probability of the managers’ funds
outperforming their benchmarks. Therefore, active portfolio managers have turned to
alternative assets such as private equity because the concentrated nature of private equity
fund portfolios provides an opportunity for excess returns. Specifically, the returns to a
private equity fund are normally the result of a fund generating large returns from only a
few of its investments that are generally concentrated in the area of expertise of the
fund’s management.
Based on the “learning” hypothesis of Kaplan and Schoar (2005), it is essential
that portfolio managers be able to differentiate between top and poorly performing
private equity funds. However, infrequent trading of private equity securities, combined
with misunderstood performance measurement techniques employing subjective
valuation measures make identifying top performers a complicated issue. In fact, Lerner,
Schoar, and Wong (2006) find that the ability to differentiate varies greatly among
private equity investors.

3

Phalippou (2006) posits that investor mispricing could partially explain investor
behavior. Based on conversations with private equity investors, he reports that several
have confided to him that they assess fund performance based upon internal rates of
return and performance multiples. In similar conversations with other private equity
investors, we find two very interesting facts. First, private equity investors not only rely
on internal rates of return and performance multiples, but they compare these measures to
the performance of public equity markets. As will later be discussed, this is a very
dangerous practice in that these measures all employ differently calculation techniques.
Second, like Phalippou (2006), we find that limited partners are not well informed about
the underperformance of private equity documented in the academic literature. We feel
that both of these issues relate to inaccurate perceptions, and therefore, incorrect
utilization of the private equity industry’s currently employed performance assessment
measurements.
We seek to add to the recent literature regarding the performance of private equity
funds by examining the measurement techniques used in the industry, as well as, those
introduced in Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and used in Phalippou and Zollo (2005) and
Phalippou and Gottschalg (2006). In performing our analysis, we utilize a new and
relatively untested database, Private Equity Intelligence’s Performance Analyst
Database. 3 In addition to the Performance Analyst Database, Private Equity Intelligence
has provided us with the underlying cash flows to the database, which allows us to dissect
the nature of a subset of our full sample’s cash flows. This new data, supplemented with
3

One exception is Lerner, Schoar, and Wong’s (2006) use of PEI’s 2004 Private Equity Performance
Monitor which was generated from the Performance Analyst database. Though we utilize some of the
same data, we are able to examine the underlying cash flows of the reported performance measures.
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Thomson Financial’s VentureXpert data, allows us to examine fund performance
measurements on a much deeper level than simply cumulative internal rates of return net
fees. Specifically, we examine five questions.
First, we compute various performance metrics based upon realized and
unrealized cash flows; comparing them with one another and with public market
performance. In the prior literature, authors have primarily argued for their chosen
measurement technique and against the others. Therefore, we seek to establish the
statistical relationship between the differing measurement techniques. Since our data is
available through the first quarter of 2006, it allows us to analyze the performance of
funds created in the late 1990s, taking into account the massive increase in fund size and
realized returns of buyout funds in recent years. Second, we examine whether unrealized
investments adversely affect final fund performance measurements.

Third, turning our

attention to interim unrealized investments, we seek to establish their correct
measurement and their predictability of final fund performance. Moreover, in the spirit
of Kaplan and Schoar (2005), we examine whether this predictability is stronger for
specialized funds. Fourth, we examine whether the unrealized investments of buyout
funds are stronger predictors than those of venture capital funds. Finally, we examine
whether the predictability of unrealized investments of funds based in the United States
are stronger predictors than those of funds based outside the United States.
Our findings suggest that reported residual values have an adverse effect on fund
performance measurements, and these effects are most severe in the tenth year of a
private equity fund’s life cycle.

However, in examining the values of unrealized
5

investments reported in the interim years of a funds life cycle, we find evidence that
these interim values reported in the middle of the fund’s life cycle are fair predictors of
the final amount of capital returned to private equity investors. In addition, we examine
the effects of an increase or decrease in the valuation of the fund’s holdings by
management and find that these values are also good predictors of final fund performance
measurements. We find evidence that this predictability relates to a number of fund and
firm specific qualities. Our results have important policy implications for both private
equity fund managers and investors.
The remainder of this dissertation progresses as follows. Chapter 2 presents a
chronological background and general overview of the private equity industry including
the typical performance measurements of private equity. We present an analysis of the
existing literature and develop of hypotheses in Chapter 3. We introduce our data and
sample selection techniques in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, we examine the results of our
statistical analyses. We report all results in tables presented at the end of the chapter in
which they are referenced. We provide a summary of the purpose and the findings of our
study, practical implications of our study, and areas for future research in Chapter 6.

6

400000

$ Millions

300000

200000

100000

0

80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06

Years
INVEST

COMMIT

Figure 1.1. Fund Capital Commitments & Investment Activity (1980-2006)
Note: The dotted line represents the yearly commitments in U.S. dollars of
capital from private equity investors to private equity funds. The full line
represents the yearly dollar value of all private equity fund investments. Source:
Thomson VentureXpert.
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CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND AND GENERAL OVERVIEW
In this chapter we provide a discussion of the development of the relatively young
and rapidly-evolving private equity industry in section 2.1. In section 2.2 we provide a
general overview of the mechanics of the private equity industry, and in section 2.3 we
provide an extensive discussion of the complexities of private equity performance
measures.
Time Periods of the Private Equity Industry
The private equity industry covers three distinct time periods, each characterized
differently. As noted by Gompers and Lerner (2001), the early period, when the industry
originated, ranges from the mid-1940s to the early to mid-1970s. Funds in this period
consisted of a small pool of privileged investors and were established as closed-end funds
where limited partners could trade shares among themselves.
The second period began when the U.S. Department of Labor issued a new
interpretation of its “prudent man” rule allowing pension funds to invest in private
equity. 4 Early deals of this period proved very successful; however, the period began its

4

The ERISA guidelines set forth by the U.S. Department of Labor had banned pension funds from
investing in venture capital funds due to their high risks. According to Anson (2006), the new
interpretation indicated that private equity investments should not be considered on a standalone basis, but
on its effects on the entire portfolio of holdings. This ruling; therefore, allowed pensions to invest in all
legitimate financial securities including the high-risk securities of private equity.
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disappointing end in 1989 with the collapse of the junk bond market, the institution of
debt moratoriums, and numerous corporate bankruptcies, many of which were associated
with the private equity industry. In fact, Kaplan and Stein (1993) found that 26 of the 83
large leverage buyouts of the late 1980s defaulted on their debt commitments, and 18
entered bankruptcy by the end of 1991. This resulted in huge losses for the private equity
funds that had financed the buyouts. They attribute this collapse to the overheated nature
of the private equity industry during the late 1980s. In an effort to mimic the early
successes of the decade, junk bond investors infused huge amounts of capital into buyout
markets during in the mid-1980s. The large amounts of capital forced fund managers
into highly competitive deals with huge valuation multiples. These transactions are
examples of money chasing deals as illustrated in Gompers and Lerner (2000). Kaplan
and Stein (1993) observed the effects of these infusions and subsequent deals as
disastrous to the private equity industry, nearly driving it into total collapse.
The final period, which continues today, began in 1992 as huge amounts of
capital began to flow into the industry from a magnitude of institutional investors. Many
of these investors are new to private equity and their effect and behaviors are still
unknown. With the infusion of capital arose an entirely new generation of private equity
firms, with different characteristics and objectives than those from the 1980s. Most
notably, funds are much larger and have more specialized investment portfolios than their
1980s counterparts. In fact, the Blackstone group recently raised the largest fund in
history with $15.6 billion in commitments and the Carlyle group expects to have a total

9

of $85 billion capital under management by the end of 2007. Never before has the
private equity industry been such a significant part of the World Economy.
The emergence of new private equity firms raises a central question. Does fund
performance differ in funds managed by older more mature firms when compared to
funds managed by younger, less experienced firms? Kaplan and Schoar (2005) find
evidence suggesting that funds managed by older, more experienced firms outperform
those managed by younger firms. A likely follow-up question to this finding is whether
performance measurement techniques contribute to this difference.

Phalippou and

Gottschalg (2006) find that this is probably the case, but the effect is only marginal.
Thus, we conclude that the treatment of unrealized investments in performance analysis
is perplexing for both young and mature fund mangers.
In addition to the “new” participants of the current period, Meyer and Mathonet
(2005) point out that the current period is different from prior periods by corporate
governance pressures, the development of a secondary market for fund investments, and a
new valuation approach.

First, corporate governance mechanisms have changed

partnership agreements within the private equity industry, as have similar mechanisms
changed the landscapes of public equity markets over the past five years. Second, a
recent trend that has developed in private equity markets is the secondary sale of funds’
held investments. Prior to this development, funds primarily could only exit investments
through public equity markets or through liquidations. In recent years, private equity
funds have begun buying and selling each others investments. Though not as lucrative as

10

a public equity market exit, secondary markets provide greater profit potential than
liquidation exits.
Finally, private equity associations have issued new guidelines for valuation and
disclosure in recent years. As a result, Meyer and Mathonet (2005) point out that limited
partners are forcing general partners to disclose valuations according to these guidelines.
Because valuations of investments which have yet to be unloaded by the fund, were much
more subjective to the assumptions and judgments of the general partners prior to the new
guidelines, many of the new valuations and underlying cash flows are still calculated
under similar assumptions.

These issues present a logical question.

Do the new

systematic valuation guidelines affect older entrants, which are familiar with the older
nonexistent system of valuation guidelines, more than they affect newer entrants? Or do
older entrants exhibit better judgment due to experience when valuing the funds
investments?

The evidence put forth by Phalippou and Gottschalg (2006) suggests the

latter.
General and Behavioral Overview of Private Equity
As noted by Gompers and Lerner (1999) and illustrated in Figure 2.1, private
equity funds are typically organized as limited partnership contracts with 10 year life
cycles that include fund raising, investing, and harvesting or unloading. 5 Funds are
established and managed by a private equity firm termed “the firm” or the “general
partner.” Those investors that qualify under both SEC criteria and the general partner’s
5

Gompers, Paul, and Josh Lerner, 1999. The Venture Capital Cycle (The MIT Press, London) presents an
interesting and in-depth look at the mechanics of the VC cycle; however, the majority of this subject is
beyond the constraints of this paper.

11

criteria are recruited as limited partners. 6 These are typically public and private pension
funds, university endowments, insurance companies, large banks, large charities, and
wealthy individuals. The funds themselves are structured as blind pools in which the
limited partners commit a dollar amount to the fund and then assume a passive role until
called upon by the general partner to fund an investment, termed a portfolio company. 7
Each limited partner is responsible for its portion of the fund’s financing needs.
Since general partners make all investment decisions, limited and general partners
only interact for two purposes. The first occurs when the general partner has identified
an investment. Once the general partner decides to invest in the portfolio company, it
contacts the limited partners to request the pro rata portion of the investment of each
limited partner’s commitment to the fund. Simply stated, if ten limited partners have
each committed equal amounts to the fund, then each limited partner is responsible for
ten percent of each investment that the fund makes. These requests are termed capital
calls, or drawdowns. Once a general partner decides that conditions are beneficial or
necessary to exit an investment, it does so by taking the company public in an initial
public offering, conducting a secondary sale to other private equity funds, or writing the
company off as a loss. In the event of a profitable exit, the general partner distributes the
profit, less its share, to the limited partner. Investments in portfolio companies continue

6

The Securities and Exchange Commission requires that any private individual or organization have a
minimum of $5 million in unencumbered financial assets to be eligible to invest in private equity.
However, the criteria for investment set by fund managers are much more complex and more stringent than
that set by the Securities and Exchange Commission.

7

Lerner (2000) states that funds are established as blind pools, so that investors do not attempt at limiting
the flexibility of fund management.
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throughout the life of the fund; however, all investments must be recovered or writtenoff by the last day of the fund’s life.
The capital call and distribution mechanisms make private equity funds selfliquidating; however, both general and limited partners are subject to liquidity risk
because funds normally do not begin distributing funds until deep into the fund’s life.
Phalippou (2006) points out that the majority of private equity partnership contracts can
be extended up to 14 years. 8 According to Pearce and Barnes (2006), private equity
funds seek to liquidate their portfolio company holdings between five and seven years
from the date of the fund’s first investment into that portfolio company. 9 Coupled with
Ljungqvist and Richardson’s (2003) finding that the majority of funds do not fully invest
until year six, limited partners should expect the contract to extend past the tenth year.
Therefore, positive cash flow should not be expected until the second half of a fund’s life.
This exposes both general and limited partners to greater liquidity risk.
In addition to the investment function, general and limited partners interact on a
regular basis to evaluate interim fund performance to maintain a healthy relationship. 10
Interim fund performance is imperative to the calculation of fund management fees.
Phalippou and Gottschalg (2006) explain the normal fee structure for private equity funds
to be two percent of committed capital during the first five years of the funds life and two

8

All limited partners must agree to extend the partnership for a set amount of time, usually in one or two
year increments.

9

It is not uncommon for private equity funds, especially venture capital funds, to engage in several rounds
of investing with a portfolio company.

10

Performance reports are generally submitted to the limited partners on a monthly basis. Those that do
not report on a monthly basis do so quarterly.
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percent of unrealized fund investments until the liquidation of the fund, plus twenty
percent carried interest if the fund’s final internal rate of return is greater than eight
percent. 11 Therefore, interim fund performance partially dictates period-to-period cash
flows to and from the fund.
In addition to management fees, limited partners must be able to gauge interim
fund performance for several reasons. First, interim fund performance is imperative to
allow for accurate reporting of a limited partner’s overall portfolio, which is partially
made up private equity investments. Second, limited partners utilize interim performance
measurements in planning for future cash flow needs.

Furthermore, Anson (2004)

explains that gauging investment performance is important for investors, such as pension
fund management, because their bonuses are normally a function of the pension’s overall
portfolio performance. Finally, Meyer and Mathonet (2005) and Kaplan and Schoar
(2005) point out that interim performance is influential in the decision of limited partners
whether or not to continue investing with the same private equity firms.
Until liquidation, private equity performance relies on valuations of unrealized
investments reported by the fund’s general partner, which are subjective in nature.
Therefore, until liquidated, subjectivity is a major factor in private equity performance
when taking into account both realized and unrealized cash flows. Capital calls from
limited partners to private equity funds represent negative cash flows, while distributions
of profits from the private equity funds to the limited partners represent positive cash
flows. Both capital calls and distributions represent realized cash flow. However, while

11

Carried interest is simply the general partner’s share of the fund’s profits.
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the fund is still active it still holds ownership positions in portfolio companies. These
positions represent unrealized cash flow termed residual or net asset values.
Because private equity funds do not fall under the protective umbrella of United
States Securities and Exchange Commission, there are no regulations to govern the
valuation practices of portfolio companies. Consequently, reported residual values are
subject to the assumptions made by the general partners about the underlying portfolio
companies. This issue presents several questions. First, if considered the terminal value
of a series of cash flows for a private equity fund, do reported residual values adversely
affect fund performance measurements? If so, why are limited partners willing to accept
a fee-based structure based upon these values? Presumably, limited partners must believe
that interim residual values are accurate and have some predictability about the final
return of the fund. We examine these issues and questions in greater depth in the
following section and in Chapter 3.
Private Equity Fund Performance Measurements
Performance data on private equity funds is quite complex when compared to
public securities performance data such as that provided via the Center for Research in
Securities Prices (CRSP). Daily closing prices combined with periodic dividend and
interest payments allow for easy return calculations for publicly traded securities.
However, the closed-end, self-liquidating nature of private equity funds make it quite
difficult to calculate reliable realized return measurements for funds. Specifically, fund
managers report cash flows on a monthly or quarterly basis because capital calls and
distributions do not occur in a set pattern. In fact, the actual return of the fund is only
15

known once the fund is fully liquidated or reaches the end of its life cycle. This is true
regardless of the cash flows realized during the life of the partnership.
The private equity industry has developed the following measurement alternatives
to evaluate performance both on an interim and post-liquidation basis: the internal rate of
return, the value multiple, the distribution to paid-in ratio, and the residual value to paidin ratio. The public market equivalent or profitability index utilized in Kaplan and
Schoar (2005), Phalippou and Zollo (2005), and Phalippou and Gottschalg (2006)
represents another performance measurement alternative.
In order to understand each performance measurement, one must first understand
the cash flows of a private equity fund. Since performance measurements are calculated
from the limited partner’s point of view, capital calls are considered negative cash flows.
Conversely, distributions are considered positive cash flows. Though the cash flow
designations of capital calls and distributions are easily understood, the cash flow
designation of residual values can be quite ambiguous. The main decision is whether to
assume that the reported residual value represents the terminal value of a fund’s cash
flow stream. If so, then residual values are considered a distribution. It is important to
note that all performance measurements reported by fund managers are calculated with
residual values included in the cash flow streams.
Internal Rate of Return
The private equity industry’s de facto standard for measuring returns is the
internal rate of return (IRR). In fact, Meyer and Mathonet (2005) point out that venture
capital associations, the Association for Investment Management and Research, and the
16

CFA Institute consider the IRR to be the most appropriate return measure for private
equity. IRRs can be calculated from the inception of a fund to any point in time during
the fund’s life up to and after termination. The IRR represents a percentage rate of return
at which the net cash flows of a fund over time can be discounted back to zero at the
present. In practical terms, the IRR is the average “work-rate” of a limited partner’s
investment.
Two critical decisions must be made when calculating an IRR. The first is
whether to use cash flows that are gross or net of fees and carried interest to the limited
partners. This decision can have a great impact on the calculation of the IRR, especially
late in the fund cycle when the majority of disbursements are made by the fund. If
calculated gross of fees, the IRR will overstate the true IRR of the fund to limited
partners. Second, Metrick (2007) illustrates the importance of the decision of whether or
not to include residual values in IRR calculations.

In practice, the majority of

participants in the private equity industry consider the residual value reported by the
general partners to be the terminal value when calculating IRR. However, Phalippou and
Gottschalg (2006) reason the majority of residual values reported by funds after the ten
year point should be written off as “living deads.” 12 Recognizing these concerns, we
calculate IRR net of fees under two specifications. The first is to include the residual
value as the terminal value in the cash flow stream and the second is to write-off all
residual values letting the final realized cash flow become the terminal value.

12

“Living Deads” represent underperforming portfolio companies still held in a private equity fund’s
portfolio.
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The standard calculation for the IRR since inception is that which satisfies the
following equation:

∑

n

i=0

CFi
RVn
+
= 0,
i
(1 + IRR) (1 + IRR) n

(1)

where:
CFi

=

Net Cash Flows to the Fund;

RVn

=

Residual Value (can be written off); and

IRR

=

Internal Rate of Return.

Meyer and Mathonet (2005) illustrate how a private equity fund IRR follows a J-Curve or
hockey stick pattern over the fund cycle. The early years of a fund are generally the
period of capital calls from limited partners to finance a fund’s investments in portfolio
companies. As a result, the IRRs of funds early in their life cycles are generally negative
or close to zero. This period of low returns is exceptionally bad for venture capital funds
and has been termed the “Valley of Tears.” As a fund progresses through its cycle, the
IRR generally increases at an increasing rate before leveling off close to the end of the
fund cycle.
The major advantage of using IRR is that it makes the appropriate adjustments for
the time value of money when dealing with the heterogeneous nature of fund cash flows.
Specifically, the IRR represents a cash-weighted rate of return where all relevant cash
flows are weighted accordingly. That is, those cash flows that take place early in the
fund cycle are given greater weight than those taking place later. One other advantage of
IRR is that it is intuitive to investors. This is an advantage because IRR is simply
calculated as a percentage rate of return, unlike other measurement techniques such as the
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value multiple which is calculated as a ratio. Another advantage is that IRR can be
compared to a hurdle rate in order to judge the success of the fund.
An effective measurement technique, IRR is not without its disadvantages. When
examined in isolation, the interpretation for the IRR is very subjective. What constitutes
a superior performance by a fund varies from individual to individual. In addition, the
mathematics of solving for the IRR within the quadratic equation can present several
problems. The first is that a fund could have multiple IRRs if there are numerous sign
changes during the fund cycle.

The findings of Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003)

suggest that the majority of sign changes can occur between years four and eight;
therefore, interim IRRs could be over or understated. However, most private equity
funds follow a negative-to-positive cash-flow pattern so this normally is not a major
problem. In addition, Meyer and Mathonet (2005) point out that general partners must
decide whether to realize short-term gains on investments to optimize IRR or to wait for
longer periods of time to optimize return multiples and/or realized returns. Furthermore,
if follow-on fundraising is dependent on current fund performance as suggested by
Kaplan and Schoar (2005), then managers of struggling funds have a disincentive to keep
performing.

Simply, because IRR weights earlier performance greater than later

performance, fund managers of underperforming funds have a low probability of
improving performance. Therefore, fund raising ability will be quite diminished.
Although interpretation, mathematical, and short-term management problems
weaken the IRR, its greatest weaknesses are its reinvestment of returns assumption, the
treatment of residual values in the calculations, and assuming the same discount rate for
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capital calls and distributions. In calculating IRR, one assumes that cash distributions in
all periods are reinvested into the fund. Both Meyer and Mathonet (2005) and Gompers
and Lerner (1996) explain how reinvestment is impossible in that most funds typically
have covenants restricting the reinvestment of capital gains. In times of higher returns,
this assumption will inflate annualized versions of a monthly or quarterly IRR. We
therefore can conclude that this assumption artificially inflates the true IRR of the fund
upward.
The effects of residual values upon IRR can severely alter its calculations.
Metrick (2007) illustrates how including the residual value of the fund as the terminal
cash flow is misleading, especially for younger funds in which the majority of their
investments are still unrealized. Specifically, the effect of including the residual value in
cash flow streams is an upward inflation of the actual IRR. This upward inflation is the
result of the cash flow associated with the reported residual value remaining unrealized.
It is impossible to determine how much of or when the reported residual value will be
distributed. Furthermore, current data does not allow research into the amount of capital
actually realized from reported residual values. The practice of including the residual
value as the terminal cash flow is performed both in interim and in final IRR calculations.
The question remains whether this should be considered acceptable practice.
Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) point out that a major weakness of the IRR is
that it assumes that capital calls and distributions are discounted at the same rate. They
argue that capital calls should be discounted at a lower rate than distributions. They
argue that capital calls should be discounted at the risk free rate while distributions
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should be discounted at a rate equal to the return of public equity securities. Therefore,
IRRs overstate the performance of the fund relative to its risk profile.
The question remains as to how one should use IRR in fund performance
evaluation. In order to eliminate the subjectivity of the IRR, one should compare it to a
hurdle rate.

Grinblatt and Titman (2002) state that the appropriate hurdle rate for

comparison of IRRs should be a rate that makes the sum of a fund’s discounted cash
flows equal the current value of a tracking portfolio of cash flows of an appropriate peer
group.

According to Pearce and Barnes (2006), this peer group should encompass

several areas to be considered accurate. First, the peer group should included funds with
the same vintage year as the fund being evaluated. It is not logical to compare a fund
raised in 1980 to a fund raised in 1990 or 2000 because each is exposed to different
market conditions that affect their decisions.

Second, the peer group should be

comprised of funds from the same industry sector as the fund being evaluated. This
allows the fund to be compared to other funds facing similar market conditions as well as
funds with similar risk compositions.

In order to control for differing levels of

competition among funds, the peer group should be made up of those funds located
within the same region as the fund being evaluated.
Phalippou and Gottschalg (2006) point out that the major error made by those
using IRR is to compare it with the return on public markets, such as, but not limited to,
the S&P 500 index. Because indexes are time-weighted measurements and the IRR is a
cash-weighted measurement, the two should not be compared. Furthermore, Metrick
(2007) cautions that investors should not try to deduce the amount of money a fund made
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for them by using the IRR. Instead, he states that investors should answer the question
how well did the fund do with our money while it had it. Though the IRR is not without
limitations, it proves an accepted and important measurement for private equity fund
performance.
Value Multiple
The value multiple, as described by Meyer and Mathonet (2005) and Metrick
(2007), is designed to measure the total value that the limited partner has derived from its
interest in the partnership. It is designed to incorporate both the realized and unrealized
cash flows from and to the fund and is calculated as follows:
n

Multiplen =

∑ CIF
i=0

i

+ RVn

n

∑ COF
j=0

j

where:
CIFi

=

total cash distributions at the end of time period I from the fund to
its limited partners;

COFj

=

total cash investments at the end of time period I from the limited
partners to the fund; and

RVn

=

residual Value of the fund’s remaining portfolio company
investments at the end of time period i.

The primary strength of the value multiple is its ease of interpretation. Simply
stated, the value multiple can be multiplied by the amount of capital invested in the fund
to determine the amount the fund has returned. However, the value multiple does not
incorporate the time value of money when evaluating cash flows. Therefore, it does not
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(2)

show the quickness that one partnership has returned value to its investors relative to
another. Meyer and Mathonet (2005) point out that another potential weakness is that the
value multiple includes the residual value. As with IRR, the inclusion of the residual
value as the terminal value over-inflates the amount of capital the fund has returned.
Again, this is due to the inability to ascertain how much of the residual value will be
realized.
Distribution to Paid-In Ratio
Due to the residual value limitations of both the IRR and value multiple; Zhu,
Davis, Kinniry, and Wicas (2004) and Meyer and Mathonet (2005) propose using the
distribution to paid-in ratio for evaluating private equity returns. A more conservative
measure than the IRR and value multiple, the distribution to paid-in ratio excludes the
subjective valuations included in residual values and does not assume the reinvestment of
distributions. The distribution to paid-in ratio measures the cumulative cash distributions
to limited partners relative to the cumulative invested capital from limited partners and is
calculated as follows:
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n

DPI n =

∑ CIF
i=0
n

i

∑ COF
j=0

,

(3)

j

where:
CIFi

=

total cash distributions at the end of time period I from the fund to
its LPs; and

COFj

=

total cash investments at the end of time period J from the LPs to
the fund.

The ratio conservatively measures performance on a realized basis by excluding
distribution reinvestment and the number of periods the fund has taken to generate this
return. Like the value multiple, the distribution to paid-in ratio is weakened by the fact
that it does not take into account the time value of money. Though both are conservative
measures of performance, Metrick (2007) explains that both the value multiple and the
distribution to paid-in ratios should be used to measure the dollar amount returned to
investors for every dollar invested.
Residual Value to Paid-In Ratio

Though the distribution to paid-in ratio provides general and limited partners with
a metric to measure the performance of the fund on cash realized basis, it is also
important for the partners to measure how much of their investment is still locked-up in a
fund. Meyer and Mathonet (2005) and Metrick (2007) propose using the residual value

24

to paid-in ratio for this measurement. Specifically, it measures the value of invested
capital that remains in the fund and is calculated as follows:

RVPI n =

n

RVn

Σ COF j

,

(4)

j= 0

where:
RVn

=

the residual value reported by the general partner at the end of
time period J; and

COFj

=

total cash investments at the end of time period J from the limited
partners to the fund.

It is important to note that due to the subjective nature of the assumptions behind the
valuation of portfolio companies, the residual to paid-in ratio potentially is a noisy and
inaccurate measure across funds.
Profitability Index

The final return measure introduced by Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and utilized by
Phalippou and Zollo (2005) and Phalippou and Gottschalg (2006) is the profitability
index. As with the IRR, the profitability index can be computed on a purely realized
basis or on a realized plus unrealized basis by including the residual values as the
terminal value.

The profitability index measures the present value of the fund

distributions relative to the present value of capital calls. It is calculated as follows:
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n

∑CIFi +RVi
i=0

PIn =

(1+r)i
n

∑COFj

,

(5)

j=0

(1+r) j

where:
CIFi

=

total cash distributions at the end of time period I from the fund to
its LPs;

COFj

=

total cash investments at the end of time period J from the LPs to
the fund;

RVn

=

residual value of the fund’s remaining portfolio company
investments at the end of time period I (can be written off); and

r

=

Represents the discount rate, normally equal to a benchmark rate
such as the return of the S&P 500 over period n.

As with IRR calculations, we calculate the profitability index net of fees under two
specifications. The first is to include the residual value as the terminal value in the cash
flow stream and the second is to write-off all residual values letting the final realized cash
flow become the terminal value.
The major strength of the profitability index is that it allows for a direct
comparison between an investment in a private equity fund to an identical investment in
another financial security, such as an equity index. A profitability index greater than one
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indicates that the fund outperformed its benchmark, and a value less than one indicates
underperformance.
However, the profitability index is not without flaws. If the residual values are
included, then they can overstate the true profitability index of the fund can be overstated
if the residual values are included in the cash flow stream. In addition to the residual
value problem, choosing an incorrect discount rate can severely bias results. Kaplan and
Schoar (2005), Phalippou and Zollo (2005), and Phalippou and Gottschalg (2006) all use
the annualized return of the S&P 500 index over the life of a fund as the discount rate.
Though this seems intuitive, it poses two problems. The first is that the S&P 500 is
traded daily in heavy volume while private equity is traded sparsely with thin volume;
therefore when used as the discount rate, the S&P 500 does not fully reflect the risk
profile of private equity funds. Second, as in the IRR calculation and suggested by
Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003), capital calls and distributions should not be
discounted at the same rate. Therefore using the return of the S&P 500 Index as the
discount rate, as acknowledged by Phalippou and Gottschalg (2006), will bias the
profitability index upward. Regardless, we follow the previously accepted practice of the
above studies and utilize the annualized return of the S&P 500 index in our profitability
index calculations. Even with its limitations, like the IRR the profitability index is an
accepted and important measurement for private equity fund performance when
comparing it to the performance of other financial securities.
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Conversations with Limited Partners

In conversations with limited partners, we found that none utilized all
performance measures in evaluating fund performance. The majority indicated that they
use the IRR, value multiple, and distribution to paid-in ratios only. In addition, the
majority of them stated that they preferred the realized cash flow plus residual value
specification for these performance measurements. Interestingly, they indicated that they
were skeptical about the predictability of interim residual values, albeit counterintuitive
to utilize a measure for one purpose but not the other. Furthering our conversations as to
why some limited partners remain with underperforming general partners, the limited
partners we spoke with believe that an internal rate of return greater than some arbitrary
rateand a value multiple greater than two indicates a high-quality performing fund. These
conversations emphasize the fact limited partners do not fully understand the behaviors of
private equity performance measures.
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Founding Firm
(General Partner)

Investors
(Limited Partners)

Ex: The Carlyle Group

Ex: CALPERS

Private Equity Fund
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Managed by General Partner

Portfolio
Company 1

Figure 2.1 Private Equity Fund Flow

Portfolio
Company 2

Portfolio
Company 3

Note: The above illustrates the capital flow of the typical private equity fund. Private equity funds are established by private
equity firms or general partners by raising capital from select investors termed limited partners. General partners provide 1%
and limited partners provide 99% of the total capital to establish the fund. Managed by the general partner, private equity
funds invest by providing equity financing to portfolio companies. Once the general partner consider the time appropriate to
exit or harvest the fund’s investment in a portfolio company it does so by taking the company public through an initial public
offering by conducting a secondary sale, or by write-off.
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CHAPTER III
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

This chapter provides an extensive discussion of the existing literature to identify
the gaps still present in private equity research. We conclude each subsection with the
development of our six major hypotheses.
Differentiating Between Private Equity Performance Measurements

Our paper builds on the recent body of literature addressing the performance of
private equity funds by examining the measurements used to evaluate fund performance
and the treatment of unrealized investments when calculating these measurements.
Current and prior literature produced varying results when comparing the performance of
private equity with that of public equity markets. As have the results on this issue varied,
so have the performance measurements employed and the treatment of residual values
within these measurements.
As discussed by Phalippou (2006), the academic literature regarding fund
performance differs greatly, drawing on several different data sources as well as the two
different methodologies employed. The first methodology, which is generally found in
the older studies, examines performance gross of fees utilizing transaction data.

For

example, Swenson (2000), Cochrane (2005), and Hwang, Quigley, and Woodward
(2005) concentrate on the returns generated by the funds’ portfolio company investments
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and their contribution to overall fund performance. Alternatively, Ljungqvist and
Richardson (2003), Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2004), Kaplan and Schoar (2005),
Phalippou and Zollo (2005), Nielsen (2006), and Phalippou and Gottschalg (2006)
examine fund performance by concentrating on fund-level returns. Though these studies
employ three different data sets, their studies are similar in that they examine the
individual cash flows of funds and their relation to overall fund performance relative to
the performance of public markets. However, they differ in their treatments of residual
values as they pertain to these cash flows. It is important to acknowledge that although
these studies examine a different question than our study; to date, this literature remains
the only private equity literature regarding performance.
Cochrane (2005) examines the effects that portfolio investments have on venture
capital fund performance. He analyzes 7,765 portfolio companies over 16,852 financing
rounds provided by the Dow Jones VentureOne Database from January 1987 to June
2000. Under the assumption that the change in the log of the company’s valuation
follows a log-normal CAPM distribution and after modeling for a sample selection bias,
he uses a maximum likelihood approach to derive the alpha and beta of the log-CAPM.
He finds a 59 percent annual gross return and excess risk-adjusted returns of 32 percent.
However, as the author acknowledges, his data is biased upward due to missing
transaction data.

Using the same dataset and after filling in much of the missing

transaction data, Hwang, Quigley, and Woodward (2005) study the effects of individual
venture capital (VC) returns on fund performance over the same time period. They
conclude that VC fund gross returns outperformed the S&P 500, but not in an amount
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that is statistically significant from zero. Therefore, it is safe to assume that net returns
would underperform the S&P 500 after paying fees and carried interest to the general
partners.
In the first major study of leveraged buyout transactions, Swenson (2000)
provides evidence that buyout funds underperform the S&P 500. His data is extracted
from the private placement memorandums collected by the Yale University Endowment.
13

Specifically, he studies the returns for 542 buyout transactions over the period 1987 to

1998. His initial results indicate that the average investment in leverage buyout funds
produced an annual return of 48 percent when the annual return to the S&P 500 was
approximately 17 percent. However, he found that when he levered the S&P 500 at the
same level as the leverage buyout transactions, it would have generated an annual return
of 86 percent gross of fees. He points out that one of the most important keys to
successful investing in the leveraged buyout market is participating in the best deals. At
the time of his study, Yale had participated in 21 percent of the best deals, leading to the
leveraged buyout portion of the Yale Endowment outperforming the S&P 500 by eight
percent net of fees. The Yale Endowment has long been attributed as being one of the
most successful endowments in the world, and much of its success can be attributed to its
private equity investments.
One could deduce from Swenson’s (2003) findings that successful investing in
private equity is simply a matter of examining the private placement memorandums put
out by the private equity firms and choosing those firms that have invested in the best
13

The private placement memorandum is essentially the equivalent the prospectus in the mutual fund
industry.
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deals. However, it is important to acknowledge that these memorandums are plagued by
a severe survivorship bias. Since private equity firms are exempt from SEC regulations
and can include what they wish in their memorandums, Phalippou (2006) rationalizes that
only those private equity firms that have been successful will be willing to include their
histories. Therefore, to gain access to the best funds that are managed by the top firms,
investors are faced with the challenge of accurately evaluating past performance of lower
sequenced funds by the top firms. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) explain that this challenge
can be quite difficult because follow-on funds are established before their immediate
predecessor fund is liquidated. Therefore, it is essential that general and limited partners
understand interim fund performance measurements and the assumptions regarding
realized and unrealized investments behind these measurements. Consequently, one of
the main purposes of the current study is to evaluate the effect of residual values upon the
five major performance measurements.
In the seminal study concentrating on fund-level returns, Gompers and Lerner
(1997) examine the risk-adjusted performance of the E.M. Warburg, Pincus & Co. group
of funds. Specifically, they marked-to-market each investment on a quarterly basis,
beginning in 1972 and ending in 1997, obtaining the quarterly cash flows of each Pincus
fund. They use these cash flow values within CAPM and Fama-French three-factor
regression models. Their findings suggest that the Pincus group generated annualized
excess risk-adjusted returns, measured by alpha of the regression models, of greater than
7 percent. The most notable study invoking fund-level analysis is Kaplan and Schoar
(2005). Examining net returns, both the IRR and the profitability index of two samples
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of 746 and 1,090 funds provided by the Venture Economics cash flow database, they
find that average private equity fund performance essentially equals that of the S&P 500
over the sample period from 1980 to 1997. This is similar to the findings of Hwang,
Quigley, and Woodward (2005).

However, they document a large amount of

heterogeneity among their sample relating to fund size and experience.

Most

importantly, their findings indicate that PE fund performance is positively related to fund
size and sequence number.
Using the same data set as Kaplan and Schoar (2005) but employing a different
methodology based on general partner estimates of value change, Jones and RhodesKropf (2004) find very similar results to Kaplan and Schoar. Specifically, they substitute
quarterly estimates of value for cash flows and find similar results to Kaplan and Schoar
(2005) that the average private equity investment has failed to outperform public equity
markets. The fact that substituting the estimates of value for cash flows does not affect
results seems to suggest that interim values supplied by general partners could be
accurate predictors of the funds’ final value and final return.
Phalippou and Zollo (2005) document significant underperformance of PE funds
when compared to the S&P 500. Analyzing an updated version of Kaplan and Schoar’s
(2005) data and correcting for sample selection bias, they find that PE firms
underperform the S&P 500 by 3.3 percent per year. In a follow-up study utilizing the
same data, Phalippou and Gottschalg (2006) find an underperformance of 3.83 percent
after adjusting for the same sample selection bias as identified in Phalippou and Zollo
(2005), but also writing off all living deads.
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These latter studies clearly establish that the average private equity investment
has failed to produce the desired above average returns relative to public equity markets.
Then why do investors continue to invest in private equity funds despite its poor
performance? The answer is the heterogeneity in fund performance documented by
Kaplan and Schoar (2005). They find that the difference in fund performance measured
by the IRR between funds in the 25th and 75th percentiles was approximately 19 percent.
This heterogeneity greatly underscores the importance of identifying top performing
funds and could possibly explain why investors continue to invest in private equity. In an
attempt to gain access to funds in the upper percentiles, investors are willing to incur
losses in early funds in order to position themselves for entry into later funds. This is
essentially the learning hypothesis introduced by Kaplan and Schoar (2005). In addition,
Phalippou and Zollo (2005) and Phalippou and Gottschalg (2006) posit that mispricing
could be a partial explanation for continued investment. That is, attempts to gain access
to the upper percentiles could result in mispricing or more likely could cause the
misinterpretation of key performance measurements, which could partially explain the
continued investment. This leads us to our first hypothesis: Private equity performance
measurements are positively correlated; and therefore, this correlation makes
differentiating between each measurement difficult:
H1 : ρ PerformanceMeasurements > 0 ,

where rho is the correlation of the following performance measurements: IRR, multiple,
distribution to paid-in ratio, residual value to paid-in ratio, and profitability index. Both
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IRR and the profitability index are calculated under the two specifications regarding
residual values.
Only Phalippou and Gottschalg (2006) directly examine the effects of residual
values on fund performance. 14

They find that writing off residual values further

decreases average fund performance by 53 basis points, the difference of 3.83 percent
from their study and the 3.3 percent from Phalippou and Zollo’s (2005) study. This
finding highlights the fact that the quality of reported residual values has developed into a
subject of great debate both in the academic literature as well as in the private equity
markets. Unlike mutual funds where their net asset values are based off marking-tomarket a fund’s investments, a private equity fund’s residual value is based on subjective
valuations determined by the general partners. This could lead to possible manipulations
of the residual values by the general partners in an effort to prop-up lower performing
funds in the short-run. Therefore, the existence of residual values and their effects upon
performance measurement techniques have only begun to be examined. Simply put, the
inclusion of residual values as the terminal cash flow significantly creates a significant
upward bias to performance measurements. This leads us to our second hypothesis: the
means of the IRR and Profitability Index based upon realized cash flows are statistically
less than the means of the IRR and Profitability Index based upon realized cash flows
plus residual values:

H 2 : χ Performance(CF ) < χ Performance(CF + RV ) ,

14

All other studies including Kaplan & Schoar (2005) and Phalippou & Zollo (2005) considered reported
residual values as the terminal positive cash flow.
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where X-bar Performance (CF) represents the mean of our performance measurements
calculated under specification one and X-bar Performance (CF+RV) represents the mean
of our performance measurements calculated under specification two. 15
Predictability of Interim Residual Values

General and limited partners must have the ability to evaluate a fund’s
performance, and ultimately the general partner’s performance, on an interim basis.
Generally, limited partners do not have the ability to easily exit the partnership agreement
pre-termination. In fact, Lerner and Schoar (2004) and Phalippou and Zollo (2005) point
out that limited partners exiting funds early incur large penalties, usually only liquidating
their positions at the original cost of their investments into the fund instead of their
portion of the fund’s current market value. Phalippou and Gottschalg (2006) identify the
characteristics of funds that report residual values after the 10th year in the fund cycle.
Particularly, these funds have not shown any activity in three years and have low
performance as measured by the profitability index.

Though unable to exit their

investments without incurring huge losses, limited partners still benefit from having the
ability to predict final return. For example, Anson (2006) points out that pension fund
managers must be able to predict future cash flows to match with ever-increasing benefits
obligations.
Though important for current fund performance prediction, interim returns are not
as important for the limited partners monitoring their current fund investments as they are

15

This hypothesis only applies to the IRR and Profitability Index because the inclusion or omission of
residual values is not an option within the calculations of the Value Multiple and Distribution to Paid-in
Ratio.

38

for evaluating future investment decisions such as whether to invest in follow-on funds
with the same private equity firm. Since general partner survival is dependent upon
raising subsequent funds, they must do so in a timely fashion. In fact, Kaplan and Schoar
(2005) find that the general partners raise follow-on funds only four or five years into the
life of the current fund. Recent activity suggests that this time period has been cut to
nearly two years. Incidentally, general partners would find it quite difficult to raise
capital without providing some indication of their past performance. Therefore, it is not
only important to measure fund returns on a post-liquidation basis but is also important to
measure returns on an interim basis beginning at the fund’s inception.
Kaplan and Schoar (2005) find that fund performance positively relates to fund
size and sequence number. Moreover, they find that venture capital funds perform better
than buyout funds. This is expected due to the greater risk associated with venture capital
funds.

In extending the Kaplan and Schoar (2005) model for predicting returns,

Phalippou and Gottschalg (2006) find that interim profitability indexes are positive
predictors of a fund’s final profitability index. This is not unexpected; however, they find
that a modified residual value to paid-in ratio, defined as the residual values as a
percentage of the present value of the amount invested in the fund, have very little
predictive ability. In fact, their findings suggest that residual values only possess
predictive abilities for large funds and funds of more established fund families, but only
in the early years of the funds’ cycles. This is counterintuitive and against Kaplan and
Schoar (2005) theory that residual values should become more accurate and revert
towards zero as the fund cycle progresses. Although the residual value to paid-in ratio is
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the preferred industry standard for evaluating residual values, we believe that this
measurement incorrectly evaluates residual values for predictive purposes. By using the
present value of a fund’s capital calls as the discounting factor, one is failing to take into
account distributions that have already been dispersed to the limited partners. This would
severely lower the ratio of residual values relative to the amount of the investment
remaining in the fund. This heavily influences those residual values reported later in the
fund cycle and could possibly explain the findings of Phalippou and Gottschalg (2006).
We correct this measurement and hypothesize the following: Interim residual values are
predictors of final fund performance:

H 3 : βRV ≠ 0 ,
where beta represents the predictability of reported residual values on final fund
performance.
Fund Characteristics and Residual Values
Residual Values of Specialized Funds

As more capital has been committed to private equity firms, funds have become
more specialized. Examining the post-buyout performance of 89 portfolio companies in
the United Kingdom between 1995 and 2002, Munari, Cressy, and Malipiero (2005) find
that buyouts by more specialized private equity firms have higher profitability levels.
This highlights the importance of specialization in that improved profitability levels of
portfolio companies should increase the performance of private equity funds once these
portfolio companies are unloaded. As pointed out by Metrick (2007) and Pearce and
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Barnes (2006), venture capital funds are normally much more specialized than their
buyout counterparts. In fact, Gompers, Kovner, Lerner, and Scharfstein (2005) find that
specialized venture capital funds with considerable industry experience are more
successful when compared to those funds with less experience. They further find that
funds that are more specialized adapt better to changing conditions in public equity
markets when compared to less specialized funds. Recent trends in leveraged buyout
markets suggest that buyout funds also have become more specialized.
Therefore, specialized fund managers should be better at valuing there portfolio
companies prior to unloading than less specialized fund managers. As a result, reported
residual values of specialized funds should be a more accurate reflection of the value that
portfolio companies earn the fund at the time of unloading.

We hypothesize the

following: the difference in fund reported performance measurements and actual
performance measurements of specialized funds is less than the difference of nonspecialized funds:
H 4 : β SPEC < 0,

where beta represents the estimated effect of specialized funds on the difference between
reported and actual performance measurements.
Residual Values of Buyout Funds

In examining the predictive ability of residual values, Phalippou and Gottschalg
(2006) find modest evidence for predictability of those residual values of larger sized
funds. The authors state that they view this result as surprising. Alternatively, we view
of this finding as intuitive. As with many of their other results, the authors find this
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predictability has a stronger significance in the earlier years of the fund cycle. Our view
is that the results of the interim residual values of larger funds points towards a greater
conclusion. Because the largest private equity funds are normally leveraged buyout
funds, we posit that the residual values of these funds should be accurate estimates of
portfolio company valuations. Our belief is that buyout fund managers base interim
valuations on each individual portfolio company’s former public market valuation. As a
result, reported residual values of buyout funds should more accurately reflect the value
that portfolio companies contribute to the fund at the time of unloading. Therefore, we
hypothesize the following: the difference in fund reported performance measurements
and actual performance measurements of buyout funds is less than the difference of nonbuyout funds:

H 5 : β Buyout < 0,
where beta represents the estimated effect of buyout funds on the difference between
reported and actual performance measurements.
Residual Values of United States Based Funds

The private equity industry has experienced many changes during the current
period. One of the major changes has been the establishment of valuation guidelines by
the major associations that provide direction for the private equity industry. These
guidelines are the result of collaboration between the industry associations to push the
industry towards more uniform reporting standards of fair market values rather than
simply valuations at cost. Though only guidelines, two significant developments have
helped move general partners in the direction of reporting residual values at fair market
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values. First, most partnership agreements are now written to stipulate that valuations
are to be based on fair market value practices. Second, the number of U.S. based public
pension funds investing in private equity has exploded over the last fifteen years. Due to
United States Freedom of Information laws, many of these funds have been forced to
make available their private equity holdings and performance history. As a result, fund
managers operating funds in the U.S. have been trending towards reporting residual
values at fair market values. Recently, these events have led to the issuance of FASB
157, which provides generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) for reporting
alternative assets at fair market values. Though the practice of reporting under fair
market value assumptions is the current trend in the British and European private equity
industries, we feel that the push towards these practices has been much stronger in the
United States. As a result, reported residual values of U.S.-based private equity funds
should be more accurately reflect the value that portfolio companies will contribute to the
fund at the time of unloading. Therefore, we hypothesize the following: the difference
between fund reported performance measurements and actual performance measurements
of U.S.-based funds is less than the difference of non-U.S. based funds:
H 6 : β NAT < 0,
where beta represents the estimated effect of buyout funds on the difference between
reported and actual performance measurements.
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CHAPTER IV
DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION

This chapter introduces the data and sample selection techniques used to test our
hypotheses. Currently only two firms, Private Equity Intelligence (PEI) and Thomson’s
Venture Economics, track private equity fund returns on an adequate scale for an
empirical analysis. 16 We obtain and use proprietary performance data provided by
Private Equity Intelligence located in London, England. Unlike the performance datasets
in prior studies, especially those using Thomson’s Venture Economics performance data,
we are able to identify the individual funds in our sample. 17 This enables us to
supplement the individual performance measurements of the Private Equity Intelligence
data with each fund’s characteristic data obtained from the Thomson Financial
VentureXpert (VX) database via the Securities and Data Corporation (SDC) platform.
While the anonymity of the samples of prior studies greatly limited the scope of those
studies, our data enables us to perform a more in-depth analysis of the different
16

The Venture One database owned by The Dow Jones Company covers the individual transactions made
between private equity funds and portfolio companies, but one would have to calculate fund cash flows
based on many assumptions. Recently, new data management firms, such as VC Experts, have entered into
the private equity data management market. However due to their tardiness of data collection, these recent
entrants will not have viable data sets for another 8 to 12 years.
17

Kaplan and Schoar (2005) acknowledge that the anonymity of their sample precludes them from
extending their study past their primary size and persistence examinations. However, a recent study by
Phalippou and Gottschalg (2006) utilizes Thomson’s “investment database”. From this database, they are
able to identify the type of fund, fund size, fund sequence, and the fraction of investments exited via an
initial public offering or a merger and acquisition. However, it is not clear whether they can identify the
exact fund by name.
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measurements used to assess private equity performance, the assumptions behind them,
and how fund and firm characteristics affect these measurements.
Data
Private Equity Intelligence

The performance data utilized in Kaplan and Schoar (2005), Phalippou and Zollo
(2005), and Phalippou and Gottschalg (2006) were provided by Thomson’s Venture
Economics, but this data has since become unavailable to the academic and financial
communities on an individual fund basis. 18 Therefore, we utilize return data on the fund
level provided via the Performance Analyst Database of Private Equity Intelligence. In
tracking over 3,100 funds, Managing Directors Mark O’Hare and Nick Arnott assemble
data from a variety of sources in North America and Europe. These sources include
voluntary reporting by general and limited partners, publications available in the public
domain because of legislation, and the financial reporting practices of some limited
partners, such as public pension funds.
Specifically, we obtain the following cumulative fund-level performance data as
reported quarterly by the general partners: internal rates of return, value multiples,
distribution to paid-in ratios, and residual value to paid-in ratios. We also obtain fundlevel characteristic data of fund vintage year and the percent of the fund commitment that
has been called. In addition to these data, PEI has provided the underlying cash flows,
including reported residual values, for roughly 222 mature funds. These cash flows allow
us to add several dimensions to our study. First we are able to complement the PEI
18

Venture Economics still provides return data in aggregate form.
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performance data with our own calculations of IRR, value multiples, distribution to
paid-in ratios, residual value to paid-in ratios as well as calculating the profitability index.
Finally, cash flow analysis allows us to calculate our performance measurements on an
interim basis, as well as examine the residual values reported by the general partners.
Thomson Financial’s VentureXpert Database

We supplement the PEI data with data obtained from the Thomson Financial
VentureXpert database accessed through the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) platform.
Specifically, we obtain firm and fund data in order to examine those specific
characteristics, which might affect performance measurement. Data obtained regarding
funds are as follows: the size of the fund, fund sequence number, sequence type, fund
type, fund’s average company and financing round investments, maximum company and
financing round investments, minimum company and financing round investments, the
fund’s total dollar amount invested in all portfolio companies, the number of portfolio
companies the fund has invested in, and the number of financing rounds the fund has
participated in. We also obtain the following data regarding general partner firms: firm
name and founding date, firm’s total capital under management, the minimum company
sales the firm requires for investment, firm’s average company and financing round
investments, maximum company and financing round investments, minimum company
and financing round investments, the firm’s total dollar amount invested in all portfolio
companies, the number of portfolio companies the firm has invested in, and the number
of financing rounds the firm has participated in.
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Sample Selection

In constructing our sample, we combine the performance data obtained from PEI
with that obtained from VX. This provides us with an accurate sample containing both
individual fund performance data and fund characteristic data. We then subset our data
using those funds for which we have the underlying cash flows to recompute the
performance measurement presented in Section 2.3 of Chapter 2. This enables us to not
only determine the accuracy of fund reported performance measurements and the effects
of residual values on these measurements, but also allows us to examine residual value
behavior associated with certain fund and firm characteristics.
In selecting their sample, Kaplan and Schoar (2005) employ the use of “quasiliquidated” funds, or funds that have been liquidated or have not reported any cash flow
for the last two years of their sample. Phalippou and Zollo (2005) and Phalippou and
Gottschalg (2006) utilize a similar sample selection technique, but include funds that
have not shown any cash flow activity over the past eighteen months during the sample
period. In continuing with these sample selection practices, we select only those funds
that are at least 10 years old and have not shown any cash flow activity for at least
eighteen months for inclusion in our sub-sample. Therefore, the last funds included in
our sub-sample are those from the 1996 vintage class. It is important to note that this
allows us to evaluate fund performance on funds raised three years after the funds
examined in the Phalippou and Zollo (2005) and Phalippou and Gottschalg (2006) data
sets.
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Data Description
Merging of Private Equity Intelligence to VentureXpert

Though merging data sets normally involves simply executing the merge
command in statistical software, merging the PEI data to the VX data proved to be quite a
difficult task that revealed several variations and discrepancies in the data. Specifically,
both reported slightly different names or abbreviations for numerous funds. PEI staff
explained that both they and Venture Economics could be acquiring information on a
particular fund from different limited partners. This could cause the assigned fund name
to differ. In addition, similar to public equity markets, the private equity market has
experienced some consolidation through merger activity and many names have been
combined and/or changed in the process. It is important to note that no central data exists
for private equity fund identification such as the EDGAR database provided by the U.S.
Security and Exchange Commission for publicly traded equity securities. Therefore,
there are not single identifiers such as CUSIP numbers assigned to publicly traded equity
securities.
We also found several funds that were identified as either a venture capital or
buyout fund by PEI, but identified differently by VX. This discrepancy is the result of
VentureXpert having several different classifications of both venture capital and buyout
funds. In order to label the fund correctly, we accessed the private equity firm’s website
and were able to identify all but two funds correctly. These funds were removed from the
sample. We also found that both databases reported different sequence numbers for some
funds. Because prior studies utilized the sequence numbers provided by VX, we feel that
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is only appropriate for us to do the same. Finally, we found that the vintage years
reported by PEI proved incorrect for several funds. We know this because these funds
had cash flow activity prior to the vintage year reported by PEI. Therefore, we use those
vintage years provided by VX.
Full Fund Sample

In Table 4.1, we provide descriptive statistics of the funds comprising our sample.
We divide our full sample into the industry’s two main periods by fund vintage year,
1980 to 1991, and 1992 to 1996. Descriptive statistics for periods one and two are
presented in Panels A and B, respectively.
As expected, the number of funds reported in Panel B is approximately five times
the size of that reported in Panel A. This difference highlights the unprecedented growth
in the industry during the 1990s. Not only is the sample size larger in the 1992 to 1996
period, but the size of the funds as well as the investment behaviors of both venture
capital and buyout funds changed dramatically during the latter period. Specifically, deal
sizes increased while the average number of investments in portfolio companies
decreased. Even more interesting is the finding that the number of financing rounds the
funds participated in decreased at a greater rate than the number of deals the funds
entered.

Funds during the current period have supplied capital to their portfolio

companies in fewer financing rounds. As described by Gompers and Lerner (2000), this
behavior is probably the result of too much money chasing too few deals.
Prior to the push towards fair market valuations, private equity funds, especially
venture capital funds, would only reevaluate their portfolio company valuations at each
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round of financing. Therefore, this has important implications for the current study.
First, fewer financing rounds should increase the predictability of the residual values of
buyout funds.

Since buyout funds are in the business of taking publicly traded

companies private, their residual values would be based upon the original valuations that
were actually set by the public market at the time of purchase for each portfolio company.
Full Firm Sample

We provide firm descriptive statistics in Table 4.2. Similar to Table 4.1, we
divide our sample into those funds founded before and after January 1, 1992. We
observe that capital under management for the older firms is more than double that of
younger firms. This is expected in that older firms have had more time to prove their
success and raise more follow-on funds. In fact, Kaplan and Schoar (2005) find that each
subsequent fund a firm raises is larger than the previous. Surprisingly, the average
portfolio company investment for the younger firms is larger than that of the older firms,
$13.4 and $12.1 million, respectively. One would expect larger firms to have the ability
to invest larger amounts in portfolio companies. A possible explanation of this finding is
that younger firms are forced to pay higher premiums to portfolio companies in the
auction process. This is important because higher premiums paid for portfolio companies
could result in inflated residual values early in the fund cycle causing their reversion
pattern to be accelerated at the end of the holding period of a portfolio company. This
could partially explain the significance of reported residual values early in the fund cycle
reported by Phalippou and Gottschalg (2006).
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Sub-sample

Our subset of funds and firms, presented in Table 4.3 provide us with the
underlying cash flows of the funds reported net of fees and including yearly reported
residual values. Our sub-sample is concentrated on those funds operated during the
current period of the private equity industry; thus, the characteristics of our sub-sample
are much more similar to that of Panel B in Table 4.1. However, it is important to
illustrate that the firm characteristics tend to indicate that our sub-sample is concentrated
in larger more experienced firms concentrated in the buyout industry. We must
acknowledge that our data is weighted heavier in buyout funds, where the Venture
Economics data is weighted heavier toward venture capital funds. This is important in
that this could cause the reported residual values of the funds of these firms to be more
accurate than those of funds raised by younger firms.
Data Comparison to Prior Studies

Since this is the first use of the PEI performance data, it is important to establish
that it behaves similar to that of the Venture Economics data utilized in the major studies
of private equity performance. Table 4.4 presents a comparison of the behavior of the
PEI performance data relative to the Venture Economics data utilized in prior studies.
Because the two studies included in Table 4.4 never ran duplicate models or utilized the
same data, we present the ranges of the main beta coefficients for those variables that
were consistent in the empirical models examined by Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and
Phalippou and Gottschalg (2006). We then ran a model based upon those variables using
our data of the following ordinary least squares regression:
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Re turn PI = α + βSize + βSequence + βVCDUM + ε

(6).

Our fund size beta coefficient of 0.23 falls within the range of 0.02 - 0.28 set by the
Phalippou and Gottschalg (2006) study. The sequence beta coefficient and coefficient for
the venture capital dummy for our model is within the range set by the both studies.
Therefore, we conclude that the Private Equity Intelligence data behaves similar to that of
the Venture Economics data utilized in prior studies.
Possible Limitations of the Data

Because both databases contributing to our sample receive much of their data
from general and limited partners, we in no way can verify the accuracy of the data.
However, both Private Equity Intelligence and Thomson support the validity of their data.
Since both general and limited partners are providing data, and additional data is gathered
in the public domain, inconsistent reporting can be identified by PEI and Thomson.
We also acknowledge that there are a lower number of observations during earlier
periods of the sample compared to the current period, and we acknowledge that this bias
skews results towards the latter portion of our sample. Because of the immaturity of the
industry and the subsequent immaturity of data collection efforts, all previously discussed
studies suffer this same weakness.

Finally, we acknowledge that much of the data in

VentureXpert is sparse to non-existent.

The majority of this non-existent data is

information regarding portfolio companies. Because our paper concentrates on fund and
firm characteristics, this does not adversely affect our results.
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Table 4.1. Fund Sample Descriptive Statistics
Panel A. Vintage Years, 1980 – 1991

Total PE (N = 274)

Items ($ millions)

Mean

Median

Fund Size
Avg. PC Investment
Max PC Investment
Min PC Investment
Avg. Round Investment
Max Round Investment
Min Round Investment
Total Investment in all PCs
No. of PC Investments
No. of Rounds Participated

172.8
7.7
42.8
0.9
5.4
40.4
0.7
123.2
26.4
65.2

5.9
1.8
6.2
0.1
0.8
4.3
0.0
43.7
22.0
51.0

Stand.
Dev.
435.1
36.3
284.3
3.9
30.8
284.1
2.9
379.3
22.2
64.9
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Panel B. Funds Vintage Years, 1992 – 1996
Total PE (N = 1,394)
Items ($ millions)

Mean

Median

Fund Size
Avg. PC Investment
Max PC Investment
Min PC Investment
Avg. Round Investment
Max Round Investment
Min Round Investment
Total Investment in all PCs
No. of PC Investments
No. of Rounds Participated

521.9
16.4
56.2
8.0
12.8
51.3
7.0
207.9
16.6
30.3

225.0
5.3
15.3
0.8
3.2
12.4
0.3
75.0
12.0
17.0

Stand.
Dev.
975.9
37.3
135.9
49.6
33.0
129.3
49.3
413.9
20.2
39.5

Venture Capital (N = 204)
Stand.
Mean
Median
Dev.
83.5
44.7
160.3
2.1
1.7
2.4
9.7
5.4
18.9
0.3
0.1
0.7
1.0
0.7
1.2
7.6
3.8
15.1
0.1
0.0
0.4
78.2
41.2
200.2
30.3
26.0
22.6
77.0
59.0
67.2

Buyout Funds (N = 70)
Stand
Mean
Median
Dev.
433.4
217.9
762.2
27.1
5.0
73.8
157.7
18.5
589.3
3.4
0.6
7.7
20.7
3.3
63.2
154.1
15.5
589.5
2.4
0.3
5.8
278.9
66.3
692.0
13.7
8.0
15.1
26.3
11.0
35.6

Venture Capital (N = 805)
Stand.
Mean
Median
Dev.
261.9
137.4
510.0
5.6
4.0
6.9
20.8
11.1
50.6
1.3
0.5
6.6
3.5
2.3
5.4
17.1
8.0
47.1
905.3
170.0
6.1
137.3
63.1
294.2
20.4
16.0
21.7
40.2
27.0
44.3

Buyout Funds (N = 589)
Stand
Mean
Median
Dev.
877.3
425.0
1,296.8
33.8
15.0
55.5
113.4
46.0
197.4
18.7
2.0
78.6
27.8
11.3
49.4
106.7
43.6
187.8
16.7
1.0
78.5
322.2
121.8
536.4
11.0
7.0
16.4
15.9
9.0
25.3

Note: Panel A provides descriptive statistics for those funds raised between 1980 – 1991and Panel B provides descriptive
statistics on those funds raised between 1992 – 1996. The descriptive statistics presented are as follows: the size of the fund, the
average, maximum, and minimum investment in a portfolio company by the fund, the average, maximum, and minimum round
investment by the fund, the total amount the fund has invested in all portfolio companies, the total number of portfolio company
investments by the fund, and the total number of round investments by the fund. All monetary values are reported in United
States Dollars.
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Table 4.2. Firm Sample Descriptive Statistics
Panel A. Founding Years, Pre 1992
Items ($ millions)
Capital Under Management
Min. PC Sales Required for Investment
Avg. PC Investment
Max PC Investment
Min PC Investment
Avg. Round Investment
Max Round Investment
Min Round Investment
Total Investment in all PCs
No. of PC Investments
No. of Rounds Participated

Mean
1,828.3
15,593.8
12.1
141.6
2.0
8.3
128.4
1.6
1,021.0
96.8
213.6

Total PE (N = 338)
Median
533.5
3,000.0
5.3
35.0
0.1
2.5
26.4
0.03
287.9
51.0
90.0

Stand. Dev.
4,463.8
33,734.6
21.2
373.8
13.9
16.8
359.1
13.7
2,294.3
147.5
344.7

Mean
857.0
11,248.8
13.4
81.1
3.9
9.6
73.0
2.9
372.3
33.8
67.7

Total PE (N = 361)
Median
300.0
5,000.0
5.4
20.0
0.5
3.0
15.0
0.2
126.8
19.0
30.0

Stand. Dev.
2,129.1
14,122.0
27.2
212.0
19.3
20.7
201.7
126.8
666.7
47.1
109.3

Panel B. Vintage Years, Post 1992
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Items ($ millions)
Capital Under Management
Min. PC Sales Required for Investment
Avg. PC Investment
Max PC Investment
Min PC Investment
Avg. Round Investment
Max Round Investment
Min Round Investment
Total Investment in all PCs
No. of PC Investments
No. of Rounds Participated

Note: Panel A provides descriptive statistics on those firms founded prior to 1992 and Panel B provides descriptive statistics on
those firms founded during and after 1992. The descriptive statistics presented are as follows: the total amount of capital
managed by the firm, the minimum amount of sales of a portfolio company to be eligible for financing under the firm’s criteria,
the average, maximum, and minimum investment in a portfolio company by the firm, the average, maximum, and minimum
round investment by the firm, the total amount the fund has invested in all portfolio companies, the total number of portfolio
company investments by the firm, and the total number of round investments by the firm. All monetary values are reported in
United States Dollars.
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Table 4.3. Sub-Sample Fund & Firm Descriptive Statistics
Panel A. Fund Statistics
Total PE (N = 222)
Items ($ millions)
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Fund Size
Avg. PC Investment
Max PC Investment
Min PC Investment
Avg. Round Investment
Max Round Investment
Min Round Investment
Total Investment in all PCs
No. of PC Investments
No. of Rounds Participated
Panel B. Firm Statistics

Mean
420.2
15.5
56.3
2.5
10.9
52.5
1.3
223.2
18.9
36.3

Median
220.0
5.1
17.3
0.4
3.5
15.3
0.2
84.3
14.0
22.0

Venture Capital (N = 92)
Stand.
Dev.
621.7
30.0
127.1
7.7
25.6
126.0
4.9
387.2
29.0
49.1

Mean
192.6
4.7
15.7
0.5
2.6
12.9
0.3
107.2
21.2
48.9

Median
121.5
3.5
11.9
0.2
1.8
9.0
0.1
66.1
19.0
33.5

Buyout Funds (N = 130)

Stand.
Dev.
231.1
4.6
20.5
0.9
2.6
15.7
0.7
206.9
15.2
49.8

Mean

Median

605.8
24.6
90.2
4.2
17.8
85.6
2.2
320.2
17.0
25.6

379.9
13.7
45.0
1.0
8.1
39.6
0.4
121.8
11.0
15.0

Stand.
Dev.
763.6
38.2
164.0
10.2
33.2
163.2
6.4
36.8
46.1
468.8

Total PE (N = 93)
Items ($ millions)
Capital Under Management
Min. PC Sales Required for Investment
Avg. PC Investment
Max PC Investment
Min PC Investment
Avg. Round Investment
Max Round Investment
Min Round Investment
Total Investment in all PCs
No. of PC Investments
No. of Rounds Participated

Mean
3,187.8
22,882.8
20.6
244.6
1.7
14.3
222.4
0.5
1,709.1
103.2
230.7

Median
1,000.0
1,000.0
8.1
50.0
0.2
4.4
39.6
0.0
479.2
51.0
86.0

Stand. Dev.
6,490.1
35,487.1
31.2
530.4
7.7
27.7
512.4
1.6
3,382.5
166.1
400.0

Note: Panel A provides descriptive statistics for those funds comprising our subset of funds. The descriptive statistics presented
are as follows: the size of the fund, the average, maximum, and minimum investment in a portfolio company by the fund, the
average, maximum, and minimum round investment by the fund, the total amount the fund has invested in all portfolio
companies, the total number of portfolio company investments by the fund, and the total number of round investments by the
fund. Panel B provides descriptive statistics for those founding firms of our subset of funds. The descriptive statistics presented
are as follows: the total amount of capital managed by the firm, the minimum amount of sales of a portfolio company to be
eligible for financing under the firm’s criteria, the average, maximum, and minimum investment in a portfolio company by the
firm, the average, maximum, and minimum round investment by the firm, the total amount the fund has invested in all portfolio
companies, the total number of portfolio company investments by the firm, and the total number of round investments by the
firm.All monetary values are reported in United States Dollars.
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Table 4.4. Base Variables Comparison
Dependent Variable: Profitability Index
Kaplan & Schoar
(2005)
Fund Size
Fund Sequence
VC Fund
Dummy
N

Phalippou & Gottschalg
(2006)

Current
Study

0.03 – 0.18
–0.01 – 0.43

0.02 – 0.28
–0.30 – 0.93

0.23
0.16

0.06 – 0.60

–0.27 – 0.20

0.54

350 – 746

852

222

a. Significant at the 0.05 level
b. Significant at the 0.01 level
Note: The dependent variable is the profitability index of our subset of funds. The
explanatory variables are the size of the fund, the sequence number of the fund, and a
dummy variable indicating whether a fund is a venture capital fund. Columns 1 and 2
present the range of the beta coefficients for the explanatory variables presented in
Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and Phalippou and Gottschalg (2006). Column 3 presents the
results of a panel regression model of our sample.
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CHAPTER V
METHODS AND RESULTS

In this chapter, we provide an empirical development of the methods employed to
test our six hypotheses presented in Chapter 3 and the results of these statistical tests.
First, we perform a correlation analysis to examine any differences between our
performance measurements. Next, we perform one-tailed t-tests for a difference in means
of our performance measures under different assumptions. In turning our attention to the
predictability of interim residual values, we perform a tobit model and ordinary least
squares regression analysis. The results and implications of each statistical analysis are
presented at the end of each subsection.
Differentiating Between Private Equity Performance Measurements
Correlation Analysis – Methods

In section 2.3 of Chapter 2, we established that performance measurements
utilized by practitioners in the private equity industry and those introduced in the
academic literature differed greatly in their interpretations and in what they measure.
However, we hypothesize that these measurements are highly correlated making it
difficult to differentiate between them. In order to clarify the interpretations of and the
relationships between private equity fund performance measurements, we provide a
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correlation analysis of these performance measurements. Specifically we calculate the
IRR, value multiple, distribution to paid-in ratio, residual value to paid-in ratio, and the
profitability index for each fund in our subset of funds on an annual basis under two
specifications. We calculate the first specification under the assumption that only realized
cash flows should be included, while the second specification assumes that both realized
cash flows plus residual values should be included. Since the IRR is the industry
standard, we use it as our basis for comparison.
Meyer and Mathonet (2005) contend that concentrating solely on the IRR presents
a major problem. Because the IRR places a higher value on cash flows that occur earlier
in the fund cycle, general partners might be tempted to realize short-term gains on
portfolio company investments to optimize IRR. The same is true for the profitability
index. The alternative to this strategy is to wait for longer periods of time to optimize
realized returns; therefore, optimizing value multiples and distribution to paid-in ratios.
Phalippou and Gottschalg (2006) voice concerns regarding the consequences on fund
performance of extending the fund past its intended 10-year cycle. They posit that the
majority of the extended funds have little or no activity. This should adversely affect the
IRRs and profitability indexes, which value earlier cash flows higher than later ones. In
order to examine the effects of extending funds past their intended ten-year cycle, we
calculate all return measurements at both the tenth and final year of each fund’s cycle.
Before performing their regression analyses, Kaplan and Schoar (2005) compared
the IRRs reported by Venture Economics to the IRRs that they computed from the funds’
cash flows. They report correlation coefficients of 0.98, indicating that the IRRs reported
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by Venture Economics’ sources were reported correctly.

When comparing their

calculated IRRs to their calculated profitability indexes, they report a correlation
coefficient of 0.88. This indicates that the two measurements are accurate calculations of
fund performance. It is important to note that all performance calculations performed in
Kaplan and Schoar (2005) were done so on a cash flow plus residual value basis.
Therefore, we are left with the question of whether any performance measurement more
accurately reflects fund performance when compared to the other measurements under
varying assumptions regarding residual values.
Prior to the passage of FASB 157, the accounting standards for interim residual
values stated that the values of all underlying portfolio companies should be reported at
cost. However, in the latter part of the 1990s and early 2000s, the National Venture
Capital Association and the comparable European associations proposed valuation
modified guidelines. In a study that examines residual values prior to and after the
issuance of the guidelines, Blaydon and Horvath (2002) show that the valuations of
portfolio companies vary greatly among general partners as far back as the late 1980s.
Kaplan and Schoar (2005), Phalippou and Zollo (2005), and Phalippou and Gottschalg
(2006) posit that residual values should become more accurate the closer a fund gets to its
termination. However, Phalippou and Gottschalg (2006) findings suggest the opposite in
that residual values only possess predictive qualities early in the fund cycle.
To examine the effect of residual values, we calculate our performance
measurements on both a realized and realized plus residual value basis at the two points
in the fund cycle described above. Phalippou and Gottschalg (2006) found that by
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writing off all “living deads” in their sample, the average profitability index declined by
approximately 50 basis points. We extend this analysis further by simply dropping all
residual values, whether deemed a “living dead” or not. In doing this, we hope to gain
further insight into the effects of all residual values on performance measurement.
In order to test for accuracy among performance measurements, we calculate and
compare Pearson correlation coefficients for our performance measurements under both
specifications regarding residual values at the tenth and final year of our fund cycles.
The purpose of including the tenth year of the fund cycle is to examine the behavior of
fund returns at the point in time when the fund should be terminating.
Correlation Analysis – Results

The results of our correlation analysis are reported in Table 5.1. As hypothesized,
the majority of the correlations between our four performance measurements are positive
and statistically significant at a minimum five-percent level. However, when we examine
the correlations of our measurements at the tenth and final year of the fund cycle and
under the two specifications regarding residual values, we observe that this correlation
decreases. Therefore, it is important to highlight and discuss these decreases and their
implications on the understanding of private equity performance measurements.
The different specifications of IRR at both time periods have positive correlations
with one another all greater than or equal to .95, with one exception. The IRR calculated
under Specification 2 including residual values at year ten has much lower correlations
ranging between .68 - .71. Most interestingly is the correlation of 0.68 between the two
different IRR calculations at the tenth year. The fact that this correlation is 0.30 less than
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the other correlations suggests that private equity fund managers could be manipulating
residual values in the tenth year to justify extending the fund cycle. In an effort to
promote the idea of extending the fund past its contracted life cycle, fund managers could
be over-inflating the residual values. This would increase the desire of limited partners to
recoup these investments eventually; therefore, they would agree to extend the fund
cycle. However, fund managers partially base valuations of portfolio companies on
present public equity market conditions at the time of the valuations. Therefore, the
effects of these market conditions on residual values could possibly cause the difference
in the correlations documented above. Alternatively, one could argue that the majority of
investments made by private equity funds simply take longer to mature; therefore, the
tradition 10-year life cycle of the fund is not long enough.
When comparing the correlations of our sample’s different performance ratios,
such as the Value Multiple and Distribution to Paid-in ratio, we find their correlations are
statistically positive ranging from 0.89 to 0.99 in the tenth and final years. This suggests
that residual values do not affect the performance ratios to the same degree that they
effect IRR and the profitability index.
In examining the correlation coefficients between all IRR calculations and the
profitability index calculations are positive and significant, ranging from 0.20 to 0.82,
with one exception. The profitability index calculated under specification one including
realized cash flow in the final fund year does not have a significant correlation with any
of the IRR calculations. This is important in that it proves a distinct difference in what is
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measured by final IRR and the profitability index of a fund.

We find similar

correlations between our profitability indexes and our performance ratios.
Finally, we find the correlation between public equity markets, measured by the
annualized return of the S&P 500 over the life of the fund, and our performance
measurements not significantly different from zero. This finding supports the hypothesis
put forth by Anson (2004) that private equity is an alternative asset. The lower the
correlation between private equity and public markets, the greater the potential benefit
from diversification essentially expanding the efficient frontier for private equity
investors.
Overall, we find partial support of Hypothesis 1 that the performance
measurements of private equity introduced in section 2.3 of Chapter 2 are positively
correlated. However, when the performance measurements are calculated at differing
time periods under different assumptions regarding residual values, we find that
correlations between the measurements decrease. These decreases seem most severe in
the tenth year of the fund cycle. With the majority of the correlations differing during
this point in time due to the inclusion of residual values, users of interim performance
measurements should be cautious about there interpretations of these measurements. In
the coming sections, we hope to shed some light on the performance and predictability of
interim residual values.
Performance Measurements Summary

In Table 5.2, we report the mean, median, standard deviation, maximum and
minimums of our performance measurements. The mean of the value multiple at year ten
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and at the final year of the fund cycle is approximately 1.66, suggesting that the average
private equity fund has returned 1.66 times the capital, including residual values; its
limited partners invested. After dropping the residual values included in the value
multiple, the mean of the distribution to paid-in ratio is 1.51 at the end of the tenth year
and 1.62 at the end of the fund cycle.
Finally, we observe the mean of the residual value to paid-in ratio is 0.92 at the
end of the tenth year and 0.07 at the end of the fund cycle. This states that the average
value of a private equity fund still has a value of ninety two percent of its invested capital
at year ten, but only seven percent at the end of the fund cycle. This has two important
implications. First, investors should expect the average private equity fund to ask for an
extension of the fund due to the large amount of value that remains in the average fund at
the expected termination point of ten years. Secondly, the seven percent value reported at
the end of the fund life partially supports the residual reversion hypothesis put forth by
Kaplan and Schoar (2005). They argue, but do not test, that if residual values are
accurate predictors of a fund’s final performance, then residual values should revert to
zero by the end of the fund cycle. However, as we point out, our findings only partially
support this hypothesis. This suggests that many fund managers still report residual
values at the end of the fund cycle.
When comparing IRRs and profitability indexes at the tenth and final year of the
fund cycle one must take into consideration that these performance measurements can be
calculated both gross and net of residual values. The mean IRRs calculated in the tenth
are 18 percent under specification one and 37 percent under specification two. The result
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of a one-tailed t-test indicate a statistically significant difference between the two; and
provides evidence in support of Hypothesis 2 that residual values over-inflate the actual
IRR of private equity funds. This clearly shows the magnitude of the effect of residual
values on IRR in the tenth year. This could partially explain the correlation behaviors we
observed for year ten in the previous section.
Though the effect of residual values on IRR is quite severe in year ten, their effect
on the final IRR is marginal in that we do not find significant difference in the two
specifications of the IRR calculation. In fact, the IRR based off realized cash flows is
actually greater than that based off realized cash flows plus residual values. We attribute
this to many residual values being reported as negatives as they are written off at the end
of the fund. Because the profitability index behaves much like the IRR, it is important to
point out that we find similar results for it.
Predictability of Interim Residual Values
Predictability of Returned Capital - Methods

In the previous analysis, we observe that eliminating fund residual values as the
terminal value in the cash flow analysis of private equity funds increases the relationship
between performance measurements. In this section, we seek to expand the literature
regarding those fund characteristics that predict fund performance concentrating on
interim residual values reported by fund managers.
We first seek to establish whether residual values can predict the amount of
capital returned to limited partners over the life of the fund. Because the amount of
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capital that can be returned has a minimum value of zero and continues positively to
infinity, as suggested by Wooldridge (2006) we introduce a Tobit model to examine the
predictability of residual values:
Capital* = β 0 + β1 (Size) + β 2 (Experience) + β 3 (VC) + β 4 (RV ) + ε ,

(7).

where:
Capital*

=

the dollar amount of money return to limited partners net
fees and carried interest;

Size

=

total size of fund commitments;

Experience

=

sequence number of the fund;

VC

=

one if a fund is a VC, zero otherwise; and

RV

=

the residual values reported in years 3 through n-1 of the
fund cycle.

Due to the earliest residual values normally being reported at cost, we begin our analysis
at year three and continue on an annual basis through the year prior to the end of the fund
cycle. The findings of Kaplan and Schoar (2005) establish fund size, fund sequence
number, and venture capital fund types to be robust predictors of the final profitability
index. Therefore, we include these variables in our Tobit model. As stated in Hypothesis
3, we expect to find that residual values are predictors of the amount of capital returned
to limited partners.
Predictability of Returned Capital - Results

The results of our Tobit model are provided in Table 5.3. As expected, both fund
size and fund sequence are positive predictors of the final amount of capital returned to
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the fund. However, the venture capital dummy variable coefficient is negative but not
significantly different from zero. Most importantly, we find that interim reported residual
values are statistically significant positive predictors of the amount of capital returned to
fund investors over the life of the fund, but only in a limited number of years.
Specifically, we find positive coefficients in years five, six, and seven. This finding
provides results similar to the ordinary least squares estimates of Phalippou and
Gottschalg (2006) that interim residual values are only significant predictors of fund
performance early in the life of the fund. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 that interim residual
values are predictors of final fund performance is supported on a limited scale.
Predictability of Fund Performance - Methods

Although Phalippou and Gottschalg (2006) write-off all “living-deads” in their
sample before calculating their profitability indexes, they do examine the predictability of
interim residual values reported by general partners during the contractually allotted time
of the fund cycle. Specifically, they test whether the residual values reported in years
three through nine have any predictability of final fund performance as measured by the
profitability index. Their findings suggest that only the residual values reported by very
large funds and/or more experienced funds have any predictability, but the statistical
significance is weak. They attribute their findings to noise built into the residual values
reported by fund managers. This is consistent with the noisy valuations of portfolio
companies found by Blaydon and Horvath (2002).
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In their analysis of the predictive power of residual values upon profitability
indexes, Phalippou and Gottschalg (2006) develop a model established on the findings of
Kaplan and Schoar (2005):
Performance = β 0 + β (Size) + β (Experience) + β (VC) + ε , (8)
where:
Performance

=

IRR, Value Multiple, Distribution to Paid-in Ratio,
Residual Value to Paid-in Ratio or the Profitability Index;

Size

=

total size of fund commitments from LPs;

Experience

=

measurement of a GP’s level of experience managing
Funds (fund sequence number); and

VC

=

one if the fund is a VC, zero otherwise.

Because the two studies utilize very similar data sets, Phalippou and Gottschalg (2006)
and Kaplan and Schoar (2005) produce similar results for the size, experience, venture
capital dummy variables. To test the predictability of the residual values, the authors
divide each annually reported residual value by the present value of the amount invested
in the fund at that time, basically the residual value to paid-in ratio modified to
incorporate the time value of money. Although it is a viable and unique measurement,
this approach to measuring residual values could affect their results. By using the present
value of the capital invested into the fund after year six, the authors are ignoring that
amount of capital that has previously been returned to the limited partners through
distributions, this ignores any accounting value changes in the residual values. This
could be decreasing the level of residual values relative to the amount of capital still
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invested in the funds in the Phalippou and Gottschalg (2006) sample. Therefore, we
focus our analysis in a different direction.
In testing the predictability of interim residual values on final fund performance,
we return to the base model established by Kaplan and Schoar (2005), Equation 6.
Building on this model, we add the annual residual value (RRV) reported by fund
management. This measurement should provide a much better picture of what is truly
occurring on an annual basis with the funds portfolio companies.

We expect the

coefficient for the annual residual value variables to be positive, indicating that the
residual values are predictors of the final performance of private equity funds.
Predictability of Fund Performance – Results

In testing Hypothesis 3 that reported residual values are positive predictors of
final fund performance, we utilize the method of panel regression models. The panel
consists of funds established in the same vintage years and groups of funds established by
the same private equity firm. To control for the heterogeneity of funds established across
different vintage years and for funds established by different private equity firms, we
include two-way fixed effects. Specifically, we utilize the vintage year of each fund as
the time variable and a unique firm number as the other fixed variable. Our models build
on Equation 6 where the dependent variable in each model is one of the primary
performance measurements discussed in section 2.3 of Chapter 2. We calculate each
performance measurement at the end of the fund cycle under Specification 1 to include
only realized cash flows. The explanatory variables included in our panel models are the
natural logarithms of fund size and sequence number, a dummy variable identifying
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venture capital funds, and the natural logarithm of the reported residual value for each
year of the fund cycle. We report the results of our regression analyses in tables 5.5
through 5.8.
Internal Rate of Return

In table 5.5, we present the results of our first model with the IRR calculated
under specification 1. We find that our model measured the variation in final fund IRR
fairly well. The coefficients of determination range from 0.11 to 0.20 for our model
where IRR is our dependent variable, indicating that 11 to 20 percent of the total
variation in the IRR is explained by our models.
As expected, we find positive coefficients for our fund size, fund sequence, and
venture capital dummy variables the greater majority of which are statistically different
from zero. This is important because it provides added evidence that our sample of funds
behaves much like that of the Venture Economics dataset, which claims to cover 95
percent of the total private equity population. Most importantly, we find that the annually
reported residual values are positive predictors of the average private equity fund’s IRR
and are statistically different from zero in seven of the eleven years examined.
Instead of providing an economic interpretation of each significant result for the
Log(RRV) variable, we highlight several of the more important coefficients.
Specifically, the coefficient of 0.24 for the Log(RRV) variable in Year 3 indicates that for
every one percent increase in value of reported residual values, the final IRR will
increase by 0.024 percent above its current level. The same interpretation can be made
for all statistically significant coefficients found for this variable. Overall, we feel that
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these results provide strong support for hypothesis three suggesting that interim reported
residual values are positive predictors of the final IRR for private equity funds.
Therefore, we can conclude that for funds with active valuation practices, the interim
reported residual values prove to be very important in monitoring the fund on an ex ante
basis.
It is important to acknowledge the fact that the coefficients for Log(RRV) in
years seven and eight are positive but not statistically different from zero. We feel that a
possible explanation for this finding is that fund managers could be holding back on
changing the valuations of their portfolio company holdings in anticipation of requesting
an extension in the fund cycle in year ten. The idea would be to increase the unrealized
values of the fund in the tenth year, which should encourage all limited partners to agree
to the extension in hopes of eventually realizing these investments.
Value Multiple and Distribution to Paid-in Ratio

Due to the value multiple and distribution to paid-in ratio having similar
interpretations of fund performance, we discuss their results together. Presented in Table
5.6 are the results of our panel model with the value multiple as the dependent variable,
while the results for DPI are presented in Table 5.7. It may seem intuitive to assume that
the final multiple and final DPI should be equal because funds cannot have a residual
value in the final year of the fund cycle. However, funds may report residual values at
the end of the fund. In order to terminate the fund, these residual values must be sold at a
deep discount or written off. Due to linearity problems, we transformed the dependent
variables in both models by taking the natural logarithms of each. We find that the
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models explain between 4 and 13 percent of the total variation in the multiple and DPI.
This is slightly lower than that found in the IRR specified models.
As expected, the coefficients for our base variables of fund size and venture
capital are positive and significant. However, the third base variable of fund sequence is
positive in both models, but only consistently statistically different from zero in the DPI
model. One could speculate that this is the result of all private equity funds returning to
the limited partners similar amounts of capital relative to the capital invested; and
therefore, underscores the need for the time value of money component offered by the
IRR and profitability measurements.
We find strong support for Hypothesis 3 that reported residual values are positive
predictors of a private equity fund’s final DPI. However, this hypothesis is not supported
by the multiple model. In fact, the Log(RRV) variable coefficients are only significant in
years 12 and 13 for the value multiple model. We view this finding as marginal in that
we consider the DPI ratio to be a superior performance ratio due to it being calculated on
realized cash flow only.
We find coefficients for the Log(RRV) variable statistically different from zero in
seven of the eleven years examined in the DPI model. Instead of providing an economic
interpretation of each significant result for the Log(RRV) variable, we highlight several
of the more important coefficients. Specifically, the coefficient of 0.22 for the Log(RRV)
variable in Year 10 indicates that for every one percent increase in value of reported
residual values, the final DPI will increase by 0.22 percent above its current level. The
same interpretation can be made for all statistically significant coefficients found for this
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variable. Therefore, we can conclude that for funds with active valuation practices, the
interim reported residual values prove to be very important for limited partners
attempting to predict the amount of value created relative to their investments into the
fund.
Profitability Index

The results of the profitability index model are presented in Table 5.8. We find
that our profitability index model explains between 18 to 31 percent in the variation of a
fund’s final profitability index. This is similar to the variation found in the Kaplan and
Schoar (2005) models measuring profitability indexes. As expected, the base variables of
fund size and sequence number are positive and significant. However, an unexpected
finding in our sample is that the venture capital dummy variable for this model
specification is not significantly different from zero on a consistent basis.
We find evidence in support of hypothesis three that reported residual values are
positive predictors of a private equity fund’s final profitability index. Specifically, we
find statistically significant coefficients for the Log(RRV) variable in 5 of the 11 years
examined. Specifically, the coefficient of 0.70 for the Log(RRV) variable in Year 11
indicates that for every one percent increase in value of reported residual values, the final
profitability index will increase by 0.07 percent above its current level.
Interestingly, the largest two significant coefficients occur in the tenth and
eleventh year of the fund cycle, just after the limited partners have decided to extend the
fund. One could reason that this increased predictability is the result of fund managers
attempting to placate those limited partners by providing accurate residual value
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estimates. This finding is opposite that of Phalippou and Gottschalg (2006), who find
that reported residual values only had predictive ability early in the fund cycle.
Therefore, we conclude that reported residual values are positive predictors of over or
under performance of public equity markets by private equity funds. However, this
finding is true only for those residual values reported late in the fund cycle.
Fund Characteristics and Residual Values
Fund Specialization and Predictability - Methods

The development of the modern day private equity industry has taken place
during one of the most exciting and explosive economic periods in history, the 1980s
through the present. The emergence of high growth technology firms combined with
increased economic competition in all sectors has caused a large amount of specialization
in the private equity industry, especially in venture capital markets. Meyer and Mathonet
(2005) explain the importance of specialization through general partner experience on
fund performance. Because limited partners are committing such large sums of capital to
funds, they are only willing to do so if they are confident in their chosen fund manager’s
experience within the fund’s targeted sector. Simply stated, a limited partner will be
unwilling to invest in a fund specializing in alternative energy investments that would to
be managed by a general partner with biotech experience.
Gompers, Kovner, Lerner and Scharfstein (2005) find that one of the key drivers
of investment activity within the venture capital industry is sector experience. They
further show that general partner experience is not easily transferable between sectors.
76

Munari, Cressy, and Malipiero (2005) provide further evidence as to the importance of
specialization.

Their findings suggest that portfolio companies of specialized firms

increase profitability which; in turn, should increase fund performance.
The findings of Munari, Cressy and Malipiero (2005) suggests that the managers
of specialized funds are better fund managers than those of less specialized funds and;
therefore, it could be reasoned that these same managers should be better at valuating
their portfolio companies.

In Hypothesis 4, we posit that the managers of highly

specialized funds report more predictive residual values than their less specialized
counterparts. As a result, the absolute value of the difference in the fund reported final
performance measurement, calculated under Specification 2, and the actual performance
measurement should be less for specialized funds. The utilization of absolute values
accounts for the fact that our sample has both positive and negative differences between
the two performance measurements. In order to test this hypothesis we introduce an
ordinary least squares regression model:
DifferenceFinalPerformance = β 0 + β (Size) + β (Experience) + β (Spec) + ε ,

(9)

where,
Difference

=

the absolute value of difference between the final IRR or
Profitability Index calculated under Specifications 1 and 2;

Size

=

total size of fund commitments from LPs;

Experience

=

measurement of a GP’s level of experience managing
funds (fund sequence number); and

Spec

=

one if the fund is a specialized fund, zero otherwise.
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We expect the estimated coefficient for the specialized funds to be negative, which
would indicate that the difference between final performance measurements is different
for specialized funds.
Buyout Funds and Predictability - Methods

In Hypothesis 5, we posit that the residual values of buyout funds should be the
most accurate in the private equity industry because the underlying portfolio companies
were once publicly traded. We reason that public markets are more efficient than private
markets and that fund managers should base their valuations upon the former public
values of their portfolio companies. In our view, this should increase the efficiency of
these valuations; therefore, decreasing the absolute value of the difference in the final
performance measurements calculated under Specifications 1 and 2. The opposite should
be true for venture capital funds in that many venture capital funds invest in portfolio
companies with no acceptable peer group of which to base values. In order to test this
hypothesis we replace the SPEC variable in Equation 9 with a dummy variable (BUY)
indicating whether a fund is a buyout fund. We expect the estimated coefficient for the
BUY variable to be negative, which would indicate that the difference between final
performance measurements is different for buyout funds.
United States Based Funds and Predictability - Methods

With the introduction of valuation guidelines and increased pressure by everyday
investors of public pension funds in the United States, many private equity funds have
chosen to report residual values at fair market values rather than cost. Therefore, in
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Hypothesis 6, we posit that the residual values of U.S. based funds should be greater
predictors of final fund performance. As a result, the absolute value of the difference in
the final performance measurements calculated under Specifications 1 and 2 should be
less for U.S. based funds. In testing this hypothesis, we replace the SPEC variable in
Equation 9 with a dummy variable (NAT) indicating whether a fund is a U.S. based. We
expect the estimated coefficient for the NAT variable to be negative, which would
indicate that the difference between final performance measurements is different for U.S.
based funds.
Results of Ordinary Least Squares

We present the results of our OLS regression models in Tables 5.10 and 5.11.
The dependent variable in each model is the absolute value of the difference of the two
calculation specifications for either the IRR or Profitability index calculated at both the
tenth and final years of the fund cycle. Results for the difference at Year 10 are presented
in Panel A of each table, while the results for the difference in the Final Year are
presented in Panel B. We do not include the value multiple and DPI in this analysis in
that each either includes residual values or does not; therefore, no difference exists
between reported and actual value multiples and DPIs.
Fund Size and Sequence Number

Because this is the first study to examine the degree of the difference in the
performance measurement reported by private equity fund management and the actual
performance of the fund, we feel it important to discuss the effects of those explanatory
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variables carried over from our base model. With the exception of that found in Panel A
of Table 5.10, the fund size variable produced a positive coefficient. This is intuitive in
that one would expect larger funds to hold more portfolio companies in their portfolios;
therefore, increased numbers of held portfolio companies could increase the value
estimation error by fund management. In addition, the overall negative coefficient
produced by the fund sequence number indicates that older more experience funds are
better predictors of the final fund performance.
Internal Rate of Return

In Table 5.10, we present the results of our OLS model with the difference in
IRRs as the dependent variable. Within Panel A, we find only economic evidence in
support of Hypothesis 4. In Model 1 of Panel B, we find strong evidence in support of
Hypothesis 4 that the difference between the IRR reported by fund managers and the
actual IRR of the fund is less for specialized funds. Specifically, the coefficient for the
SPEC dummy variable in Panel B is negative and statistically significant. However,
when we control for the existence of buyout and U.S. based funds in Model 4, we find
only economic evidence supporting this hypothesis. We attribute this to the overall
difference of the IRR specifications to be quite small. Therefore, we fail to draw a
consensus that the residual values for specialized funds are more accurate at predicting
the final IRR than those of less specialized funds.
The results for Hypothesis 5 that the difference in IRR specifications is less for
buyout funds are similar to those found for Hypothesis 4. In fact, the coefficient for the
BUY dummy variable is negative but not significantly different from zero in Models 2
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and 4 in Panel A, indicating only economic support for Hypothesis 5.

Complementing

this result, we find evidence that supports the difference in IRR specifications is be less
for buyout funds in the final year of the fund cycle. Specifically, in Model 2 of Panel B
we find a negative and significant coefficient for the BUY dummy variable. Similar to
the Hypothesis 4 findings, when we control for the existence of buyout and U.S. based
funds in Model 4, we find only economic evidence supporting this hypothesis.
Consequently, we fail to draw a consensus that the residual values for buyout funds are
more accurate at predicting the final IRR than those of non-buyout private equity funds.
Though we find some evidence supporting Hypotheses 4 and 5, the results do not
support Hypotheses 6 that the difference in IRR specifications is less for U.S. based
funds. Both the economic and statistical evidence suggests that the difference in IRR
specifications could be greater for U.S. based funds. We find positve but not statistically
different from zero coefficients for the NAT dummy variable in both Models 3 and 4 in
Panels A and B. However, we must issue caution in interpreting this finding as fact in
that we found no statistical evidence. Therefore, if the difference in IRR specifications is
greater for U.S. based funds, the difference is probably only marginal.
Profitability Index

In Table 5.11, we present the results of our OLS model with the difference in the
profitability index specifications as the dependent variable. We find strong evidence in
support of Hypothesis 4 that the difference in profitability index specifications is less for
specialized funds. Specifically, the estimated coefficient for specialized funds in Models
1 and 4 of Panels A and B is negative and significant at the 5 and 1 percent levels. The
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negative coefficient is as expected and suggests that the difference in the profitability
index specifications are less for specialized funds in both the tenth and final years of the
fund cycle. Therefore, we conclude that the residual values for specialized funds are
more accurate at predicting the final profitability index than those of less specialized
funds.
The results for Hypothesis 5 that the difference in profitability index
specifications is less for buyout funds are similar those found for Hypothesis 4. In Model
2 of Panel A, we find the coefficient for buyout funds to be both negative and
significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. However, when we control for the
existence of specialized and U.S. based funds, the BUY coefficient retains its economic,
but loses its statistical significance.

In Panel B, we find negative and significant

coefficients in Models 2 and 4. Our conclusion is that residual values of buyout funds are
more accurate at predicting the final profitability index than those of non-buyout funds.
Unlike the results for Hypotheses 4 and 5, the findings for the coefficient of U.S.
based funds do not provide support for Hypothesis 6. We posited that the difference in
profitability index specifications should be less for U.S. based funds when compared to
funds based in other countries. Our findings are attributable to the fact that European
funds have recently fallen under the same pressures as U.S. funds in reporting residual
values at fair market values. Therefore, we conclude that the residual values for U.S.
based funds are no more accurate at predicting the final profitability index than those of
non-U.S. backed funds.
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Table 5.1. Correlation Analysis of Performance Measurements
Pearson Product-Moment Correlation (H0: ρ = 0)
IRRCF10
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IRRCF10
IRRCFF
IRRRV10
IRRRVF
Mult10
MultF
DPI10
DPIF
PICF10
PICFF
PIRV10
PIRVF
Public

1.00
0.98b
0.68b
0.96b
0.70b
0.71b
0.79b
0.71b
0.73b
–0.07
0.75b
0.75b
0.02

IRRCFF
1.00
0.71b
0.98b
0.72b
0.76b
0.79b
0.76b
0.74b
–0.08
0.76b
0.78b
0.02

IRRRV10

IRRRVF

Mult10

MultF

DPI10

DPIF

PICF10

PICFF

PIRV10

PIRVF

Public

1.00
0.74b
0.18a
0.16a
0.18a
0.16a
0.17a
0.10
0.20b
0.20a
–0.11

1.00
0.75b
0.75b
0.79b
0.76b
0.74b
–0.06
0.80b
0.82b
–0.03

1.00
0.74b
0.89b
0.75b
0.83b
–0.13
0.95b
0.81b
–0.01

1.00
0.83b
0.99b
0.83b
–0.14
0.75b
0.94b
0.11

1.00
0.83b
0.93b
–0.14
0.89b
0.80b
0.06

1.00
0.83b
–0.13
0.76b
0.95b
0.12

1.00
–0.07
0.90b
0.83b
–0.02

1.00
–0.09
–0.08
–0.18a

1.00
0.84b
–0.10

1.00
–0.04

1.00

a. Significant at the 0.05 level
b. Significant at the 0.01 level
Note: Performance measurements are calculated at the tenth (10) and final years (F) of the fund cycle for the IRR, Value
Multiple, Distribution to Paid-in Ratio, and the Profitability Index. Internal Rate of Return and Profitability Index are calculated
under the two specifications regarding residual values. Measurements subscripted with CF are calculated under specification 1
that includes only realized cash flows and measurements subscripted with RV are calculated under specification 2 that includes
the residual value as the terminal cash flow of a private equity fund’s cash flow stream.

Table 5.2. Performance Measurement Summary
Panel A: Performance Measurements (Year 10)
IRRCF
Mean
Median
Standard Dev.
Maximum
Minimum

0.18
0.16
0.20
0.92
–0.07

IRRRV
b

0.37
0.22
0.84
10.04
–0.11

MULT

DPI

RVPI

PICF

PIRV

1.63
1.34
1.19
8.27
0.00

1.51
1.20
1.20
8.15
0.00

0.92
0.94
0.45
4.60
0.00

1.16
1.00
0.85
6.34
–0.69

1.25a
1.04
1.11
10.01
0.00

Panel B: Performance Measurements (Final Year)
Mean
Median
Standard Dev.
Maximum
Minimum

IRRCF

IRRRV

MULT

DPI

RVPI

PICF

PIRV

0.18
0.13
0.18
0.92
–0.12

0.19
0.16
0.19
0.92
–0.07

1.66
1.48
1.07
8.26
0.00

1.62
1.45
1.06
8.26
0.00

0.07
0.08
0.39
1.35
–2.17

2.13
0.98
3.33
20.50
0.00

1.19b
1.07
0.76
6.15
–0.80

a. Significant at the 0.05 level
b. Significant at the 0.01 level
Note: Panel A provides the mean, median, standard deviation, maximum, and minimum
values of our performance measurements calculated in the tenth year of the fund cycle,
while Panel B provides the mean, median, standard deviation, maximum, and minimum
values of our performance measurements calculated in the final year of the fund cycle.
We calculate IRR and the Profitability Index under Specifications 1 and 2 regarding
residual values. Using one-tailed t-tests we examine Hypothesis 2 that IRRs and
Profitability Indexes based on cash flows plus residual values are greater than these
performance measures based on cash flows only.
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Table 5.3. Tobit Model Results – Capital Return
Dependent Variable: Amount of Capital Returned to Investors ($ U.S.)

Fund Size
Fund Sequence
VC Dummy
Residual Value
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Log Likelihood
R2Anova

Years of the Fund Cycle
Y7
Y8
Y9

Y3

Y4

Y5

Y6

1.11c
(0.00)
46.17c
(0.00)
–16.82
(0.77)
0.14
(0.22)

1.07c
(0.00)
46.10c
(0.00)
–9.54
(0.88)
0.21
(0.21)

1.05c
(0.00)
46.07c
(0.00)
–5.82
(0.92)
0.30c
(0.00)

1.08c
(0.00)
47.64c
(0.00)
–7.49
(0.89)
0.21b
(0.01)

1.12c
(0.00)
48.39c
(0.00)
–16.19
(0.78)
0.12a
(0.10)

1.15c
(0.00)
47.76c
(0.00)
–24.71
(0.67)
0.01
(0.92)

–1983.5
0.81

–1981.7
0.81

–1978.2
0.81

–1964.4
0.81

–1966.3
0.81

–1967.7
0.81

Y10

Y11

Y12

Y13

1.16c
(0.00)
44.47c
(0.00)
–27.91
(0.64)
–0.12
(0.11)

1.23c
(0.00)
42.08c
(0.00)
–29.07
(0.62)
–0.18
(0.13)

1.25c
(0.00)
35.23b
(0.00)
–14.54
(0.84)
0.07
(0.78)

1.22c
(0.00)
50.67b
(0.00)
–41.76
(0.62)
–0.05
(0.88)

1.77c
(0.00)
12.62
(0.00)
50.28
(0.57)
–0.54
(0.13)

–1916.6
0.82

–1704.5
0.77

–1289.2
0.78

–966.4
0.78

–655.3
0.72

a. Significant at the 0.10 level
b. Significant at the 0.05 level
c. Significant at the 0.01 level
Note: The dependent variable for is the total amount of capital returned to the limited partner over the life of the fund. The
explanatory variables are the size of the fund, the sequence number of the fund, a dummy variable indicating a venture capital
fund, and the reported residual value in years 3 – 13 of the fund cycle.

Table 5.4. Panel Regression Summary Statistics
Panel Regression Independent Variables
Mean
SIZE
SEQ
RRV3
RRV4
RRV5
RRV6
RRV7
RRV8
RRV9
RRV10
RRV11
RRV12
RRV13

398,000,000
4.5
227,132,166
258,399,004
256,946,679
255,370,338
226,846,674
199,524,430
170,648,711
83,836,368
58,323,006
38,774,668
24,893,595

Median
312,700,000
3.0
102,907,047
119,785,766
107,107,759
97,483,500
88,513,479
77,264,882
57,506,802
34,921,702
27,009,552
15,246,000
11,465,148

Standard
Deviation
318,787,166
4.9
378,863,752
441,714,649
411,661,114
429,648,291
401,329,911
367,492,951
323,172,743
258,614,271
124,068,077
125,550,927
100,379,422

Maximum

Minimum

6,011,600,000
34.0
2,828,148,804
4,029,781,678
3,557,452,671
3,738,875,545
3,606,502,875
3,361,216,125
2,410,002,948
2,086,926,375
521,593,500
587,573,550
532,696,257

5,500,000
1.0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-326,052,609
-506,201,448
-605,810,784

Note: Provided are the mean, median, standard deviation, maximum, and
minimum values of the independent variables of our Panel Regression models.
Fund size (SIZE) is the amount of capital commitments used to raise a fund and
the fund sequence (SEQ) number represents the fund’s position in the sequence of
funds raised by the fund family. RRV is the fund’s reported residual value on an
annual basis. We examine residual values reported in Years 3 through 13 of the
fund cycle. Values are measured in millions of U.S. dollars, except for SEQ.
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Table 5.5. Panel Regression Results – IRR
Dependent Variable: Internal Rate of Return

Log(SIZE)
Log(SEQ)
VC Dummy
Log(RRV)
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F-Value
R2

Years of the Fund Cycle
Y7
Y8

Y3

Y4

Y5

Y6

0.05c
(0.00)
0.02c
(0.01)
0.12c
(0.00)
0.24c
(0.00)

0.04c
(0.00)
0.02c
(0.00)
0.11c
(0.00)
0.15c
(0.00)

0.04c
(0.00)
0.02b
(0.01)
0.14c
(0.00)
0.10c
(0.00)

0.04b
(0.01)
0.02c
(0.00)
0.13c
(0.00)
0.08c
(0.01)

0.03c
(0.00)
0.02c
(0.00)
0.14c
(0.00)
0.02
(0.52)

10.44
0.15

13.50
0.18

9.60
0.14

9.71
0.14

7.92
0.12

Y9

Y10

Y11

Y12

Y13

0.03b
(0.01)
0.02c
(0.00)
0.14c
(0.00)
0.02
(0.48)

0.04b
(0.01)
0.02b
(0.01)
0.13c
(0.00)
0.07b
(0.02)

0.05c
(0.00)
0.03c
(0.00)
0.12c
(0.00)
0.08c
(0.00)

0.07c
(0.00)
0.02a
(0.07)
0.13c
(0.00)
0.10c
(0.00)

0.05c
(0.00)
0.02b
(0.02)
0.09b
(0.04)
0.04
(0.19)

0.05b
(0.01)
0.02a
(0.09)
0.04
(0.37)
0.04
(0.28)

7.94
0.12

8.74
0.13

11.07
0.17

10.32
0.20

5.18
0.15

3.45
0.18

a. Significant at the 0.10 level
b. Significant at the 0.05 level
c. Significant at the 0.01 level
Note: The dependent variable is the final Internal Rate of Return calculated under specification 1. The explanatory variables are
the natural logarithms of the size of the fund and the sequence number of the fund, a dummy variable indicating a venture capital
fund, and the natural logarithm of the annually reported residual value. We control for fund vintage year heterogeneity and
management firm heterogeneity by including two-way fixed effects.

Table 5.6. Panel Regression Results – Log(Value Multiple)
Dependent Variable: Log(Value Multiple)

Log(SIZE)
Log(SEQ)
VC Dummy
Log(RRV)
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F-Value
R2

Years of the Fund Cycle
Y7
Y8

Y3

Y4

Y5

Y6

0.08b
(0.03)
0.03
(0.15)
0.24b
(0.01)
0.12
(0.49)

0.10b
(0.01)
0.03
(0.13)
0.22b
(0.02)
0.07
(0.43)

0.09b
(0.01)
0.03
(0.15)
0.23b
(0.01)
0.04
(0.67)

0.09b
(0.01)
0.03
(0.14)
0.23b
(0.02)
0.05
(0.52)

0.08b
(0.00)
0.03
(0.16)
0.24b
(0.01)
0.09
(0.19)

4.02
0.06

4.07
0.06

3.95
0.05

4.11
0.06

4.46
0.06

Y9

Y10

Y11

Y12

Y13

0.08b
(0.01)
0.02
(0.14)
0.24b
(0.01)
0.04
(0.52)

0.07b
(0.02)
0.03
(0.11)
0.25b
(0.01)
0.09
(0.19)

0.09b
(0.03)
0.05
(0.04)
0.27b
(0.01)
0.10
(0.17)

0.10b
(0.03)
0.03
(0.25)
0.25b
(0.02)
0.03
(0.74)

0.07
(0.20)
0.04
(0.15)
0.16
(0.20)
0.15a
(0.10)

0.02
(0.68)
0.02
(0.39)
0.11
(0.35)
0.28b
(0.01)

4.12
0.06

4.19
0.06

5.63
0.09

3.40
0.07

2.96
0.09

2.96
0.07

a. Significant at the 0.10 level
b. Significant at the 0.05 level
c. Significant at the 0.01 level
Note: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the final Value Multiple. The explanatory variables are the natural
logarithms of the size of the fund and the sequence number of the fund, a dummy variable indicating a venture capital fund, and
the natural logarithm of the annually reported residual value. We control for fund vintage year heterogeneity and management
firm heterogeneity by including two-way fixed effects.

Table 5.7. Panel Regression Results – Log(Distribution to Paid-in Ratio)
Dependent Variable: Log(Distribution to Paid-in Ratio)
Years of the Fund Cycle
Y6
Y7
Y8

Y3

Y4

Y5

Log(RRV)

0.10b
(0.04)
0.05b
(0.05)
0.31b
(0.01)
0.03
(0.91)

0.11b
(0.02)
0.05b
(0.04)
0.28b
(0.02)
0.20a
(0.07)

0.11b
(0.02)
0.04a
(0.08)
0.32b
(0.01)
0.16
(0.16)

0.11b
(0.02)
0.05b
(0.05)
0.29b
(0.01)
0.16a
(0.09)

0.11b
(0.02)
0.05b
(0.04)
0.31b
(0.01)
0.12
(0.19)

F-Value
R2

4.29
0.06

5.16
0.07

4.81
0.07

5.21
0.07

4.89
0.07

Log(SIZE)
Log(SEQ)
VC Dummy
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Y9

Y10

Y11

Y12

Y13

0.10b
(0.02)
0.05b
(0.04)
0.30b
(0.01)
0.14a
(0.09)

0.12b
(0.01)
0.05b
(0.05)
0.33b
(0.01)
0.16a
(0.08)

0.16c
(0.00)
0.06b
(0.05)
0.38c
(0.00)
0.22b
(0.02)

0.21c
(0.00)
0.02
(0.53)
0.40c
(0.00)
0.31c
(0.00)

0.10a
(0.06)
0.04
(0.12)
0.21
(0.11)
0.17a
(0.09)

0.04
(0.52)
0.03
(0.36)
0.16
(0.24)
0.10
(0.39)

5.20
0.08

5.34
0.08

6.51
0.10

6.23
0.13

2.85
0.08

0.95
0.04

a. Significant at the 0.10 level
b. Significant at the 0.05 level
c. Significant at the 0.01 level
Note: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm final Distribution to Paid-in Ratio. The explanatory variables are the
natural logarithms of the size of the fund and the sequence number of the fund, a dummy variable indicating a venture capital
fund, and the natural logarithm of the annually reported residual value. We control for fund vintage year heterogeneity and
management firm heterogeneity by including two-way fixed effects.

Table 5.8. Panel Regression Results – Profitability Index
Dependent Variable: Profitability Index
Years of the Fund Cycle
Y6
Y7
Y8

Y3

Y4

Y5

Log(RRV)

0.77c
(0.00)
0.14b
(0.01)
0.44a
(0.08)
–0.41
(0.47)

0.81c
(0.00)
0.17c
(0.00)
0.34
(0.19)
0.08
(0.73)

0.83c
(0.00)
0.16c
(0.00)
0.35
(0.17)
0.26
(0.28)

0.82c
(0.00)
0.17c
(0.00)
0.38
(0.14)
0.04
(0.83)

0.84c
(0.00)
0.17c
(0.00)
0.36
(0.16)
0.27
(0.17)

F-Value
R2

27.14
0.30

26.67
0.29

27.04
0.29

27.31
0.30

27.96
0.30

Log(SIZE)
Log(SEQ)
VC Dummy
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Y9

Y10

Y11

Y12

Y13

0.84c
(0.00)
0.17c
(0.00)
0.34
(0.19)
0.33a
(0.07)

0.82c
(0.00)
0.16c
(0.00)
0.37
(0.15)
0.06
(0.75)

0.93c
(0.00)
0.18c
(0.00)
0.36
(0.19)
0.54b
(0.01)

0.88c
(0.00)
0.19b
(0.01)
0.50a
(0.10)
0.70c
(0.00)

0.60c
(0.00)
0.20b
(0.01)
0.01a
(0.09)
0.33a
(0.07)

0.30
(0.06)
0.19b
(0.01)
–0.56
(0.10)
0.51a
(0.08)

28.48
0.31

26.85
0.30

24.71
0.31

16.98
0.29

8.38
0.21

4.73
0.18

a. Significant at the 0.10 level
b. Significant at the 0.05 level
c. Significant at the 0.01 level
Note: The dependent variable is the final Profitability Index calculated under specification 1. The explanatory variables are the
natural logarithms of the size of the fund and the sequence number of the fund, a dummy variable indicating a venture capital
fund, and the natural logarithm of the annually reported residual value. We control for fund vintage year heterogeneity and
management firm heterogeneity by including two-way fixed effects.

Table 5.9. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Summary Statistics
Dependent Variables
Mean

Median

Standard
Deviation

Maximum

0.2080
0.0089
0.1001
0.9389

0.1383
0.0067
0.0386
0.2659

0.2638
0.0385
0.5108
3.4763

1.6034
0.1421
0.5434
5.3057

Mean

Median

Standard
Deviation

Maximum

Minimum

398,000,000
4.5

312,700,000
3.0

318,787,166
4.9

6,011,600,000
34.0

5,500,000
1.0

DIFFIRR10
DIFFIRRF
DIFFPI10
DIFFPIF

Minimum
–0.2238
–0.1388
–3.6662
–20.1788

Independent Variables

Fund Size
Fund Sequence

Note: Panel A provides the mean, median, standard deviation, maximum, and minimum
values of our performance measurements calculated in the tenth year of the fund cycle,
while Panel B provides the mean, median, standard deviation, maximum, and minimum
values of our performance measurements calculated in the final year of the fund cycle.
We calculate both IRR and the Profitability Index under Specifications 1 and 2 regarding
residual values. Using one-tailed t-tests we examine Hypothesis 2 that IRRs and
Profitability Indexes based on cash flows plus residual values are greater than these
performance measures based on cash flows only.
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Table 5.10. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results – IRR
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Difference in IRR Specifications (Year 10)

Log(SIZE)
Log(SEQ)
SPEC

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

–0.11a
(0.08)
–0.31b
(0.01)
–0.23
(0.24)

–0.11a
(0.07)
–0.28b
(0.03)

–0.12a
(0.06)
–0.30c
(0.01)

NAT
F-Value
R2

0.01
(0.95)

–0.11b
(0.05)
–0.28b
(0.06)
–0.19
(0.32)
–0.24
(0.21)
0.00
(0.99)

2.91
0.04

2.35
0.05

–0.26
(0.16)

BUY

3.38
0.04

3.60
0.05

Model 4

Panel B: Dependent Variable: Difference in IRR Specifications (Final Year)

Log(SIZE)
Log(SEQ)
SPEC

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

0.02c
(0.00)
–0.01a
(0.09)
–0.02a
(0.08)

0.02c
(0.00)
–0.01
(0.18)

0.02c
(0.00)
–0.01b
(0.11)

NAT
F-Value
R2

0.01
(0.77)

0.02c
(0.00)
–0.01
(0.15)
–0.02
(0.12)
–0.01
(0.20)
0.00
(0.77)

5.91
0.07

4.36
0.08

–0.02a
(0.09)

BUY

6.92
0.08

6.70
0.08

Model 4

a. Significant at the 0.10 level
b. Significant at the 0.05 level
c. Significant at the 0.01 level
Note: The dependent variable is the difference between the final Internal Rates of Return
calculated under Specifications 1and 2 at the tenth and final year of the fund cycle. The
explanatory variables are the natural logarithms of the size of the fund and the sequence
number of the fund, and dummy variables indicating specialized funds, buyout funds
(BUY), and U.S.-based funds (NAT).
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Table 5.11. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results – Profitability Index
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Difference in PI Specifications (Year 10)

Log(SIZE)
Log(SEQ)
SPEC

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

0.03
(0.12)
–0.13c
(0.00)
–0.12c
(0.00)

0.03
(0.11)
–0.11c
(0.00)

0.03
(0.16)
–0.13c
(0.00)

–0.04
(0.61)

0.03a
(0.09)
–0.11c
(0.00)
–0.15b
(0.01)
–0.04
(0.56)
–0.14b
(0.01)

4.56
0.06

5.85
0.12

–0.16b
(0.01)

BUY
NAT
F-Value
R2

7.42
0.00

7.26
0.09

Panel B: Dependent Variable: Difference in PI Specifications (Final Year)

Log(SIZE)
Log(SEQ)
SPEC

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

0.49c
(0.00)
–1.27c
(0.00)
–1.64c
(0.00)

0.49c
(0.00)
–1.07c
(0.00)

0.47b
(0.01)
–1.22c
(0.00)

–0.17
(0.80)

0.51
(0.00)
–1.14c
(0.00)
–1.47c
(0.00)
–1.24b
(0.01)
–0.19
(0.78)

7.72
0.10

8.60
0.17

–1.41c
(0.00)

BUY
NAT
F-Value
R2

11.75
0.14

10.97
0.13

a. Significant at the 0.10 level
b. Significant at the 0.05 level
c. Significant at the 0.01 level
Note: The dependent variable is the difference between the final Profitability Indexes
calculated under Specifications 1and 2 at the tenth and final year of the fund cycle. The
explanatory variables are the natural logarithms of the size of the fund and the sequence
number of the fund, and dummy variables indicating specialized funds, buyout funds
(BUY), and U.S.-based funds (NAT).
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we present a summary of the direction and purpose of the current
study including a summary of its findings. We then present the contributions of our
findings to the academic body of research regarding private equity funds; as well as,
discuss the implications of our findings for practitioners in the private equity industry.
Finally, we provide several topics for future research.
Summary of Study’s Purpose

The tremendous growth and development of the private equity industry over the
past the past two and a half decades has been just short of phenomenal. Many in the
financial community credit the private equity industry for being one of the principal
drivers of the changes in corporate culture witnessed in the 1980s. In addition, many
credit venture capitalists with providing the backbone of the birth and tremendous growth
of the “new economy”.

Most recently, the financial community has observed the

industry’s effects on the premiums of the current merger and acquisition boom. Though
academic research has provided coverage of the industry’s effect on its portfolio
companies, research has yet to provide an extensive coverage of the workings of the
private equity fund. The primary reason for this void has been the lack of available data.
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Using proprietary fund-level data provided by Private Equity Intelligence, we
attempt to answer one of the most notable questions currently debated both inside and out
of the private equity industry. Specifically, we seek to examine the effect of fund
reported residual values on fund performance measurements and the predictability of
these reported values on final fund performance. Our findings suggest that prior research
in this area has over-discounted and examined improper measurements of residual values.
Therefore, the results of prior research suggest the role of residual values to be only
marginal when comparing the performance of private equity funds to that of public equity
markets.
Summary of Results

Our findings provide several contributions to the existing literature regarding the
performance measurements of private equity funds. First, the present study is the first to
examine all private equity return measurements.

Our findings suggest that when

evaluating the performance of private equity funds, one should not rely exclusively on
one performance measurement, but should incorporate all performance measurements
collectively. We base this conclusion on the fact that each measurement evaluates a
different aspect of fund performance and behaves differently than its counterparts.
Second, we examine the relation between the different fund performance
measurements under varying assumptions regarding residual values.

We find that

including reported residual values in performance calculations has an adverse effect on
these calculations in that it over-inflates the performance measurement. In addition,
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including residual values in performance calculations decreases the correlations between
performance measurements.
After correcting for incorrect measurements of residual values utilized in previous
studies, we find that interim residual values are positive predictors of final fund
performance.

Overall, our findings on the effects of residual values on final fund

performance should illustrate to limited partners the dangers of making investment
decisions under their current investment strategy of gauging fund performance.
Currently, limited partners report fund performance based upon realized and unrealized
cash flows, but do not use interim fund reported residual values to predict final
performance of private equity funds. Therefore, our results should encourage limited
partners to report fund performance based upon realized cash flows.
Contributions

Our findings provide important contributions to the current body of academic
research examining private equity funds and to practitioners in the private equity
industry. Particularly, we provide evidence suggesting that residual values reported by
funds on a yearly basis are positive predictors of final fund performance.

This

complements the findings in Phalippou and Gottschalg (2006) and provides a method of
reducing the problems in the treatment of residual values that they document.
Our findings have important policy implications for both fund managers and fund
investors. First, our findings suggest that the interim performance reporting practices of
general and limited partners should include performance measurements based on both
realized cash flows and realized plus unrealized cash flows. Our findings could provide
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the average investor who finds themselves at the mercy of their pension fund managers a
better interpretation of the private equity section in their pension’s annual report.
Future Research

Though academic research in the area of private equity is gaining momentum,
many pertinent research topics remain. According to a recent article in the Wall Street
Journal, an increasing number of mutual funds are beginning to enter private equity
markets both as direct and indirect investors. This presents two interesting questions that
warrant further examination.

First, will mutual fund managers utilize the same

performance measurement practices as the private equity industry? If so, what will be the
consequences for the everyday investor that is the backbone of the mutual fund industry?
Secondly, how will mutual fund managers consistently mark-to-market on a daily basis
the valuations of their private equity holdings?
With constantly increasing costs associated with keeping a corporation public,
mainly due to Sarbanes-Oxley Regulations, many chief executive officers are opting to
take their corporations private. This trend is being financed by leveraged buyout funds
which seem to purchase any corporation they wish. Unlike the leveraged buyouts of the
1980s, current leverage buyout funds are not limited by size in what they acquire. This is
due to two main reasons. First, leveraged buyout funds have more cash on hand than
ever before. These cash reserves combined with banks willing to lend to funds at up to
ten times the fund’s cash reserves, allows funds to acquire almost any size companies.
However for those companies that are too large for a single fund to purchase, leverage
buyout funds are forming syndicates to raise the needed capital to purchase the largest
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companies. These “club deals” present an interesting topic for further research. Of the
club members, which fund’s managerial; and therefore, valuation practices will be
utilized. Or will each fund value its position in the company purchased by the club. If
so, what valuation should limited partners that are invested in more than one of the club
member funds use?
The current study involves the examination of the annual valuations, reported as
the residual value, of all portfolio companies held by the fund. Our findings suggest that
fund managers are probably at least decent at valuating their funds’ holdings. A possible
follow-up study would be to evaluate the valuations of portfolio companies on an
individual basis comparing each company’s eventual sale value to the funds’ forecasted
values.
These are but a few of the interesting topics that remain unanswered about the
private equity industry. Never before have financial markets experienced an industry or
sub-asset class that has the ability to change and adapt to market developments with the
quickness and ease that private equity seems to. With every change and adaptation, a
new research question develops.

We expect research in private equity to continue

gaining momentum and remain relevant for the foreseeable future.
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